12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
1069.
On 17 July, Lt
Gen Fry reported that MNSTC‑I had made recommendations
for
changes to
the ISF structures following concerns expressed by Prime Minister
Maliki
about the
ISF’s ability to tackle the current security
situation.989
Mr Maliki
was reported
to have:
“… little
confidence in the police and [he] thinks that the army should be
greatly
expanded.
The view from MNF‑I and MNSTC‑I is that the currently planned
ISF
force
structure is about the right size and properly balanced between the
[Iraqi]
MOD and
the MOI.”
1070.
The main
changes proposed were:
•
The Iraqi
Army should have a second Divisional HQ in Baghdad; one
additional
brigade in
each of Diyala and Anbar; two additional battalions for 10th
Division
in Basra;
an additional Special Operational battalion in Baghdad plus
400
armoured
vehicles and a mobile armoured strike force.
•
The
National Police should have a “near‑term reconstitution, to
restore
standards
of training, discipline and leadership, and a two‑year plan
to
reorganise
and retrain them so that they evolve into a
Carabinieri/gendarmerie
force”.
•
To bring
together existing units into a rapid response national
counter‑terror
force
overseen by the IMOD and a national strike force comprising
a
mechanised
brigade, a Special Forces commando battalion and a
National
Police
brigade.
1071.
Lt
Gen Fry reported that the key theme of the recommendations was
“a better
not bigger
ISF, within budget” and that “we are close to an agreed ISF size
and shape,
revised in
the light of experience to address the developing operational
challenges”.
1072.
On 20 July,
Mr Patey sent a valedictory prior to leaving
Iraq.990
He
wrote:
“Maliki
knows he must reduce and eventually eliminate the power of the
militias
but does
not feel he has sufficient forces at his disposal or cover within
his political
circles to
do so whilst terrorism and the insurgency show no signs of abating.
We
are in a
Catch 22; those insurgents who might consider joining the political
process
are
unlikely to do so until the militias have been disbanded or
disarmed. As long
as AQ‑I and
other groups are bombing Shia markets and mosques the militias
will
continue to
pose as a better security option than the ISF and to assuage the
desire
for revenge
…
“But the
position is not hopeless … Our strategy must be to get the Iraqis
to
increasingly
take the lead and responsibility. This will produce some
uncomfortable
989
Minute Fry
to PSO/CDS, 17 July 2006, ‘Development of the Iraqi Security
Forces’.
990
eGram
31514/06 Baghdad to FCO London, 20 July 2006, ‘Iraq:
Valedictory’. This is the
corrected
version of
his valedictory; the original was 31444/06.
301