The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
Despite 10
years of searching, no one has found a credible successor
to
Saddam.
•
If a
coalition takes control of Baghdad (especially without catching
Saddam),
it will
probably have to stay there for many years.”
116.
Mr Hoon
wrote that the UK “should support President Bush and be ready for
a
military
contribution” in Iraq. The UK had “made some progress at getting
inside the
Pentagon
loop”, but he cautioned that the UK was:
“… not
privy to detailed US planning, either strategically across the
region or on
Iraq.
Before any decision to commit British forces, we ought to know that
the US
has a
militarily plausible plan with a reasonable prospect of success
compared to
the risks
and within the framework of international law. Our involvement in
planning
would
improve their process – and help address our lead time problem. It
would
enable
either CDS to reassure you that there is a sound military plan or
give you a
basis to
hold back if the US cannot find a sensible scheme … I suggest one
of your
objectives
at Crawford should be to secure agreement to the UK’s participation
in
US military
planning …”
117.
Finally,
Mr Hoon proposed that Mr Blair might raise with President
Bush “the need
for a
comprehensive public handling strategy, so that we can explain
convincingly why
we need to
take such drastic action against Iraq’s WMD now”.
118.
Mr Hoon’s
letter was copied to Mr Straw and to Sir Richard Wilson,
the Cabinet
Secretary.
119.
Lord Boyce
told the Inquiry:
“The point
of asking for access … was if the Americans were going to start …
down
a route
of planning for military operations in Iraq, and if the Prime
Minister was going
to indicate
… that might be something … we would be involved in, then the
earlier
we got
involved … the earlier we would get an understanding of what might
be
120.
Sir Kevin
Tebbit told the Inquiry that “there was no such thing at that stage
as
military
planning”. It was “quite clear” that some in the US were pushing
for military
action to
deal with WMD proliferation, “not just against Iraq, but against
other countries
too”. The
“background papers” produced for Mr Blair’s visit to Crawford
were “policy
papers
rather than military planning documents”. Those papers helped to
inform
Mr Blair’s
thinking but there were “no recommendations”.61
121.
Mr Hoon
told the Inquiry that, if there was a possibility of the US taking
military
action to
which the UK might make a military contribution, the
MOD:
60
Public
hearing, 27 January 2011, page 4.
61
Public
hearing, 3 December 2009, pages 7‑9.
194