6.3 | Military equipment (pre-conflict)

41. On learning lessons, the NAO report stated:

“Some lessons identified during previous operations were re-learned, which

illustrated the tendency that skills learned on medium size operations such as the

Gulf War dissipate over time as people move on. There is a strong argument that

exercises of the size of Saif Sareea need to be conducted regularly in order to keep

skills and experience up to date and to check that lessons previously identified have

been implemented.”

42. In March 2002, the NAO considered the MOD’s progress in implementing

a Combat ID strategy following the 1998 SDR.

43. A report by the NAO on 7 March 2002 acknowledged the complexities surrounding

Combat ID and recognised that the MOD had developed a clear strategy for finding a

solution.18

44. The NAO did find, however, that there was more that could be done to move the

issue forward. Amongst the projects it identified as a way of enhancing Combat ID work

was Battlefield Target Identification (BTID). The NAO wrote that the MOD had spent £7m

over the last 10 years on researching land solutions to Combat ID and there had been a

successful trial of a BTID prototype in September 2001. Despite that, a proposal to fit an

armoured brigade with BTID had not passed an Initial Gate Business Case.19

45. The MOD was confident that it would have integrated BTID equipment ready to

participate in a US-led NATO demonstration in September 2005. That would provide an

opportunity to show if its solution was compliant with the relevant NATO Standardisation

Agreement. The MOD was confident that its solution was “already compliant”.

46. A meeting in May 2002 highlighted concerns about whether the readiness

levels specified in the SDR could be met.

47. On 21 May, Mr Blair attended a meeting with the Chiefs of Staff, Mr Geoff Hoon,

Defence Secretary, and Sir Kevin Tebbit, MOD Permanent Secretary, to discuss current

operations and resources.20

48. The note of the meeting recorded that Admiral Sir Michael Boyce, the Chief of the

Defence Staff (CDS), said that the Armed Forces had “been under-resourced since

the SDR” and they “could not continue to make do”. From “each operation there was a

lengthening list of inadequacies”. In August the MOD “would reach a cliff edge, having

to collapse operational capability to stay in budget”.

18 National Audit Office, Ministry of Defence: Combat Identification, 7 March 2002, HC 661.

19 The procurement process, including the phases for business cases, is explained in Section 14.1.

20 Note Rycroft, 21 May 2002, ‘Prime Minister’s Meeting with Chiefs of Staff’.

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