The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
“consider
an early, steadying phone call from you to Bush; and pencil in
a
January
meeting between you.”
260.
During a
meeting with Mr Hoon and Adm Boyce to discuss military
planning on
11 December
(see Section 6.1), Sir David Manning and Sir Richard
Dearlove also
briefed
Mr Blair on their recent visits to Washington and “on UK
attempts to secure
credible
evidence that the Iraqi WMD declaration was false.81
261.
Mr Rycroft
recorded that Mr Blair:
“… said
that we needed to analyse the Iraqi declaration, ask pointed
questions
about
issues which the declaration failed to deal with … encourage Blix
to ask these
questions
of the Iraqis too, and continue to work on securing credible
evidence that
Saddam was
pursuing WMD programmes.”
262.
Mr Blair
would speak to President Bush and possibly Dr Blix in the next
few days.
263.
Mr Campbell
wrote in his diaries:
“C
[Sir Richard Dearlove] and David Manning were just back from
the US and
they
reported the mood there was far tougher. They [the US] felt Saddam
was just
messing
about and that Blix was hopeless and too soft.”82
264.
In preparation
for a conversation with President Bush, Mr Stephen Pattison,
Head
of the FCO
United Nations Department, provided advice on key messages for
Mr Blair.83
265.
The FCO
messages were:
•
We’re
working fast on analysing the declaration and identifying
discrepancies
between it
and our intelligence.
•
We should
not rush to a final judgement. It will be worth taking a little
time
to build
the best possible case against Iraq.
•
The UK
would adopt a sceptical tone when Dr Blix briefed the Security
Council
on 19
December.
•
The onus
was on Iraq to demonstrate it was co‑operating fully and
UNMOVIC
should be
encouraged to push hard. Access to information would be
crucial.
•
The UK
should help UNMOVIC to identify personnel who might be able
to
provide
relevant information.
•
An omission
in the declaration would not “by itself” constitute a material
breach.
•
It was
“much more likely that we shall be able to establish a material
breach over
time, as we
build up a pattern of non‑compliance which is sufficiently serious
to
81
Letter
Rycroft to Watkins, 11 December 2002, ‘Iraq: Military
Preparations’.
82
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power:
Countdown
to Iraq.
Hutchinson,
2012.
83
Letter
Pattison to Rycroft, 11 December 2002, ‘Iraq: PM’s Conversation
with President Bush’.
48