The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
295.
The AHMGIR
agreed that the DTI should encourage UK oil companies to
“develop
strategies
towards the Iraqi oil sector and otherwise help the UK take
advantage of oil
296.
A week later,
Ministers were informed that the DTI planned a series of
meetings
with the
major oil companies, “to begin to discuss more general Iraq oil
issues
297.
Oil production
was estimated at between 400,000 and 500,000 bpd; the target
was
to reach
between 2.5m and 2.8m bpd (described as the pre-conflict level) by
the end
of 2003.
298.
From early
June 2003, and throughout the summer, there were signs that
security
in both
Baghdad and the South was deteriorating (see Section
9.2).
299.
A paper on the
management of the DFI was submitted to the 5 June meeting of
the
AHMGIR
(chaired by Mr Straw).158
300.
The paper
stated that while resolution 1483 made the UK jointly responsible
(with
the US) for
disbursements from the DFI, it contained little detail on how the
DFI should
be managed.
The UK needed to settle that issue quickly with the US; spending
decisions
could start
being made in the next few weeks. The management arrangements
needed
to meet the
UK’s objectives in terms of transparency and accountability; in
particular, the
arrangements
needed to meet the commitments in the resolution to use resources
in the
DFI “in a
transparent manner” and to ensure that oil sales were “made
consistent with
international
best practice”.
301.
The Annotated
Agenda for the meeting stated that the CPA had circulated a
draft
regulation
which gave the US Administration “sole oversight” over DFI
spending.159
Such an
arrangement would marginalise UK influence and risk presentational
problems,
but was not
settled US policy. The UK was lobbying in Washington and Baghdad
to
amend the
draft regulation.
302.
On 9 June, Ms
Cathy Adams from the Legal Secretariat to the Law
Officers
sent a
reply to a letter of 21 May from FCO Legal Advisers seeking advice
on
303.
Ms Adams
advised that the resolution clearly imposed joint US/UK
responsibility
for
disbursements from the DFI, and that it was therefore important to
ensure that the
156
Minutes, 22
May 2003, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation meeting.
157
Paper
Cabinet Office, 29 May 2003, ‘Iraq: Update for
Ministers’.
158
Annotated
Agenda, 5 June 2003, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation meeting,
attaching Paper,
[undated],
‘Implications of and Modalities for the Development Fund for
Iraq’.
159
Annotated
Agenda, 5 June 2003, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation
meeting.
160
Letter
Adams to Llewellyn, 9 June 2003, ‘Iraq: Effect of Security Council
Resolution 1483 on the
Authority
of the Occupying Powers’.
418