5 |
Advice on the legal basis for military action, November 2002 to
March 2003
620.
Mr Straw
set out his reasoning in some detail, making clear that it was
predicated
on a veto
only by France. That was “in practice less likely than two or even
three vetoes.
The points
made included:
•
The upsides
of defying “the” veto had been “well aired”. It would “show at
least
we had a
‘moral majority’ with us”.
•
In public
comments he and Mr Blair had kept their “options open on what
we
should do
in the event that the resolution does not carry within the terms
of
the [UN]
Charter”. That had “been the correct thing to do”. “In private we
have
speculated
on what to do if we are likely to get nine votes, but be vetoed”
by
one or
more of the P5.
•
Although in
earlier discussion he had “warmed to the idea” that it was
worth
pushing the
issue to a vote “if we had nine votes and faced only a French
veto”,
the more he
“thought about this, the worse an idea it becomes”.
•
The
intensive debate over Iraq in the last five months had shown how
much
faith
people had in the UN as an institution; and that “far from having
the ‘moral
majority’
with us … we will lose the moral high ground if we are seen to defy
the
very rules
and Charter of the UN on which we have lectured others and
from
which the
UK has disproportionately benefitted”.
•
The “best,
least risky way to gain a moral majority” was “by the ‘Kosovo
route’
–
essentially what I am recommending. The key to our moral legitimacy
then
was the
matter never went to a vote – but everyone knew the reason for
this
was that
Russia would have vetoed. (Then, we had no resolution to fall
back
on, just
customary international law on humanitarianism; here we can fall
back
on 1441.)”
•
The veto
had been included in the UN Charter “for a purpose – to
achieve
a
consensus”. The UK could not “sustain an argument (politically,
leave
aside
legally) that a distinction can be made between a ‘reasonable’ and
an
‘unreasonable’
veto”. That was a completely subjective matter.
•
The “three
recent meetings of the Council more than fulfil the
requirement
for
immediate consideration of reports of non-compliance. So we can
say
convincingly
that the process set out in 1441 is complete. If we push a
second
resolution
to a veto, then the last word on the Security Council record is a
formal
rejection
of a proposal that Iraq has failed to take its final
opportunity.”
621.
Mr Straw
advised that it would be “more compelling in Parliament and with
public
opinion to
take our stand on the basis of 1441, and the overwhelming evidence
that Iraq
has not
used the four months since then to co-operate ‘immediately,
unconditionally
and
actively’”; and that the UNMOVIC [clusters] document would be “a
material help
in making
that case”.
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