The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
411.
Mr Blair
said that it was “unlikely” that Saddam would comply with the
new
resolution;
even if he let the inspectors back in he would probably prevent
them from
doing their
job. He added:
“We should
then be in a very powerful position in demanding action in response
to
his
obstruction and prevarication.”
412.
Mr Blair
suggested the need, in parallel with UN activity, to:
“… start
making military deployments to demonstrate to Saddam and
the
international
community our seriousness of intent; and to be ready to move if
we
had to.
The message would be stark; either the regime must change in
response
to the
UN resolution, or it would be changed through military
action.”
413.
Mr Blair
stated that there would be a need to table a very strong resolution
that
would
stipulate intrusive inspection; and that Dr Blix would do a
“thorough job”. Dr Blix
had put
forward some good ideas about UNMOVIC’s coverage of Iraq in a
discussion
the
previous day. The resolution would also need to include provisions
for humanitarian
monitoring
inside Iraq, and possibly force protection for UNMOVIC. “The trick
would be
to make a
resolution acceptable to Security Council members but sufficiently
stringent to
bring about
profound change in Iraq were Saddam to implement it.”
414.
Mr Blair
also set out the need to make a good public case against
Saddam,
publishing
all the evidence. The UK would publish a dossier. He stated that
the US
and UK:
“… must
build our case, persuading the international community of the
nature of the
threat. In
particular we must get over to our publics the reality that any
crisis in the
Gulf
generated by Saddam would inevitably involve us.”
415.
Later
Mr Blair stated that there was a need to explain the case for
action fully to
public
opinion: “While insisting that no‑one wanted war, we must spell out
why we had to
act.” This
included reminding people of the horrors of Saddam’s
regime.
416.
Mr Blair
said that there was a:
“… natural
reluctance to do difficult things, made worse by ignorance … of
Saddam’s
capabilities
and intentions. We had to correct this, at the same time answering
the
legitimate
question of why we were taking action now. 11 September was a
powerful
argument
for dealing with threats before they materialised … At some
point,
WMD and
terrorism would come together, with appalling consequences,
unless
we took
action.”
164