3.6 |
Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January
2003
724.
Dr ElBaradei
stated that the presence of international inspectors in Iraq
“continues
to serve as
an effective deterrent to and insurance against resumption of
programmes
to develop
weapons of mass destruction, even as we continue to look for
possible
past activities”.
725.
Dr ElBaradei
concluded:
“… we have
to date found no evidence that Iraq has revived its nuclear
weapons
programme
since the elimination of the programme in the 1990s … [O]ur work
is
steadily
progressing and should be allowed to run its natural course … [W]e
should
be able
within the next few months to provide credible assurance that Iraq
has no
nuclear
weapons programme. These few months … would be a valuable
investment
in peace
because they could help us avoid a war. We trust that we will
continue
to have the
support of the Council … to verify Iraq’s nuclear disarmament
through
peaceful
means and to demonstrate that the inspection process can and does
work
as a
central feature of the international nuclear arms control
regime.”
726.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock reported that, in subsequent informal consultations of
the
Council,
there was general scepticism that Iraq had “co‑operated
adequately”, but also
a desire
for more time.245
727.
Sir Jeremy
reported that Ambassador Negroponte had delivered a
pre‑prepared
statement
saying that there was nothing in either Dr Blix or
Dr ElBaradei’s reports which
gave hope
that Iraq ever intended to comply with resolution 1441 and that the
time was
fast
approaching when the Security Council would have to demonstrate it
meant what it
had
said.
728.
Sir Jeremy
stated that the Council had heard “a catalogue of
unresolved
questions”.
The “onus was on Iraq to prove the zero it had declared” and to
provide
“substantive
evidence”. Iraqi co‑operation had been “limited and grudging”
and
looked like
“a carefully considered policy of withholding information and
obstruction”.
UNMOVIC and
the IAEA needed to conduct more intrusive inspections and “carry
out
more
productive interviews to unravel the facts”.
729.
At a later
meeting, Dr Blix and Dr ElBaradei had provided answers to
specific
points
raised in the informal discussion, including:
•
Dr Blix
had complained about the number of Iraqi minders for
inspections.
•
There had
been demonstrations during inspections but UNMOVIC had
not
been intimidated.
•
Dr Blix
felt that there was a determination at a high level to co‑operate
on
process but
“on substance, Iraq simply said the outstanding questions
were
nonsensical”.
Unless that changed, he was “not optimistic of
solutions”.
245
Telegram
152 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 28 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Informal
Consultations
to Consider
Blix and El‑Baradei Reports’.
129