The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
623.
On 22
February, Maj Gen Shaw reported on “a significant week” in which
“All the
indicators
… would suggest that JAM is losing the initiative in
Basra.”325
As a
result, JAM
was
threatening to “make Basra burn” if the ISF continued to co‑operate
with the MNF,
and there
had been increased intimidation of locally employed civilian staff
which had
reduced
attendance levels.
624.
Maj Gen Shaw
continued:
“It is
difficult to determine if this is the tipping point at which the
people of Basra
will either
decide to stand and fight the influence of militant JAM or will
choose to
acquiesce
to their control of the street. It is certainly not the moment to
take the
pressure
off, and points to the need to continue STRIKE operations and this
in turn
emphasises
the need of the ISTAR [Intelligence, Surveillance, Target
Acquisition
and
Reconnaissance – see Section 14.1] and specialist … assets that can
help us
maximise
our effect.”
625.
On 23
February, Dr Marsden wrote in her weekly report:
“We
continue to get reports of JAM members leaving the city for fear of
arrest.
And there
are signs that some elements of Basra JAM may be willing to talk to
us.
This and
other indicators would suggest that JAM could be losing the
initiative in
Basra. But
there are other Iranian‑influenced elements of JAM who continue to
hit
us …
Reports of intimidation are at a new high. Over the month we have
also seen
a spike in
execution‑style killings … One Locally Employed Civilian was found
dead
with a note
attached to his chest stating that this is what happens to
collaborators
with MNF
…
“We are
seeing noticeably less political fallout from our assertiveness
than we would
have done
last year. There are signs that the political and public mood may
be
becoming
more hostile to JAM – and more understanding of our attempts to
deal
with its
most egregious elements.”326
626.
Following Dr
Marsden’s report, Mr Blair’s Private Secretary for Foreign
Affairs
requested
from the FCO “advice on what more MND(SE) can do to support
action
against the
JAM, including Iranian elements”.327
627.
At the request
of the Iraq Senior Officials Group, a CIG assessed violence in
Anbar
province
and the threat it posed to the MNF and the Iraqi government on 23
February.328
325
Minute Shaw
to CJO, 22 February 2007, ‘GOC MND(SE) – Southern Iraq update – 22
February 2007’.
326
Letter
Marsden to Aldred, 23 February 2007, ‘Basra: Weekly
Report’.
327
Letter
Fletcher to Siddiq, 26 February 2007, ‘Iraq: Basra’.
328
CIG
Assessment, 23 February 2007, ‘Iraq: The Struggle for
Anbar’.
116