3.2 |
Development of UK strategy and options, January to April 2002 –
“axis of evil” to Crawford
undermining
efforts to keep Saddam nervous about the West’s intentions
while
efforts are
made to re-open weapon inspections.”89
246.
The article
also reported “Signs of real unease” had begun to emerge “last
night”
about “the
perceived hardening of Tony Blair’s opposition towards Iraq”.
Officials had
described
the discussion in Cabinet as a thoughtful and sombre discussion of
the
options.
Downing Street had denied that a Minister had spoken out against
the military
option.
247.
Lord Wilson
told the Inquiry that, the day after the 7 March Cabinet, reports
of the
meeting
“appeared in virtually every newspaper”.90
The reports
were not very accurate,
but they
had “caused huge ructions”.
248.
Given Mr
Blair’s subsequent actions, the question of what Cabinet
Members
understood
they had endorsed is a matter of some importance.
249.
Cabinet
minutes do not provide a verbatim record of the discussion
in
Cabinet.
Their purpose is to provide a record of the key points made and
the
decisions
taken.
250.
The
discussion undoubtedly took place against a background
of
considerable
Parliamentary, public and media debate about possible US
military
action to
depose and replace Saddam Hussein and whether the UK would
support
and
participate in such action.
251.
In the
previous week, both Mr Blair and Mr Straw had made
public
statements
that Iraq was a threat which had to be dealt with, and Mr
Straw
reiterated
to Cabinet the need for the British public and international
opinion to
understand
“the true nature of the threat posed by the [Iraqi] regime and the
need
to respond
effectively”.
252.
The
discussion in Cabinet was couched in terms of Iraq’s need to
comply
with its
obligations and future choices by the international community on
how
to respond
to the threat which Iraq represented.
253.
Mr Blair
and Mr Straw went to some lengths to assure their colleagues
that
no
decisions had been taken and Cabinet was not being asked to take
decisions.
254.
Cabinet did
endorse the conclusion that Iraq’s WMD programmes posed
a
threat to
peace and a strategy of engaging closely with the US Government
in
order to
shape policy and its presentation. But it did not discuss how that
might
be
achieved.
89
The
Guardian, 8 March
2002, Cabinet
concern grows over Blair’s tough talk on Iraq.
90
Public
hearing, 25 January 2011, page 88.
431