The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

275. In his memoir, Mr Blair wrote:

“So when I look back ... I know there was never any way Britain was not going to

be with the US at that moment, once we went down the UN route and Saddam was

in breach. Of course such a statement is always subject to in extremis correction.

A crazy act of aggression? No, we would not have supported that. But given the

history, you couldn’t call Saddam a crazy target.

“Personally I have little doubt that at some point we would have to have dealt

with him ...”131

276. At “about 3.15pm UK time” on 17 March, Sir Jeremy Greenstock announced that

the resolution would not be put to a vote, stating that the co‑sponsors reserved the right

to take their own steps to secure the disarmament of Iraq.132

277. The subsequent discussion in the Council suggested that only the UK, the US,

and Spain took the view that all options other than the use of military force had been

exhausted.133

278. A specially convened Cabinet at 1600 on 17 March 2003 endorsed the decision

that the diplomatic process was now at an end and Saddam Hussein should be given

an ultimatum to leave Iraq; and that the House of Commons would be asked to endorse

the use of military action against Iraq to enforce compliance, if necessary.134

279. In his statement to the House of Commons that evening, Mr Straw said that the

Government had reluctantly concluded that France’s actions had put a consensus in

the Security Council on a further resolution “beyond reach”.135

280. As a result of Saddam Hussein’s persistent refusal to meet the UN’s demands,

the Cabinet had decided to ask the House of Commons to support the UK’s participation

in military action, should that be necessary to achieve the disarmament of Iraq “and

thereby the maintenance of the authority of the United Nations”.

281. Mr Straw stated that Lord Goldsmith’s Written Answer “set out the legal basis

for the use of force”.

282. Mr Straw drew attention to the significance of the fact that no one “in discussions

in the Security Council and outside” had claimed that Iraq was in full compliance with

its obligations.

283. In a statement later that evening, Mr Robin Cook, the Leader of the House of

Commons, set out his doubts about the degree to which Saddam Hussein posed a

131 Blair T. A Journey. Hutchinson, 2010.

132 Telegram 465 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 18 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Resolution: Statement’.

133 Telegram 464 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 18 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Resolution’.

134 Cabinet Conclusions, 17 March 2003.

135 House of Commons, Official Report, 17 March 2003, columns 703‑705.

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