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10.1  |  Reconstruction: March 2003 to June 2004
Planning and preparing for the transfer of sovereignty
936.  The 12 February meeting of the AHMGIR considered an FCO paper entitled
‘UK Representation in Iraq Post-Transition’.545
937.  In the paper, the FCO set out proposals for an Embassy in Baghdad, a Consulate
General in Basra and a representative in the North.546 The FCO also suggested that the
UK needed to consider how international assistance in the South should be co-ordinated
after CPA(South) closed on 30 June.
938.  The AHMGIR agreed the shape of British representation and tasked officials to
consider the practicalities, and requested a paper on co-ordination of the international
effort in the South, for discussion at its next meeting.
939.  Sir Hilary Synnott paid a farewell call on Mr Blair on 17 February.547 Sir Hilary
told Mr Blair that reconstruction was the key to maintaining consent in the South.
Reconstruction projects had a long lead-time but were now kicking in. Political transition
and the dismantling of CPA(South) could lead to a loss of momentum and civil unrest.
Sir Hilary’s particular worry was the portfolio of projects conceived and initiated by the
UK but funded by the US. Those could suffer if the US focused on new projects and
DFID on UK-funded projects. He hoped there would still be a “locally co-ordinated (and
ideally UK-led) international effort” in the South. Mr Blair agreed on the need to maintain
momentum on reconstruction.
940.  Sir Hilary told the Inquiry that Mr Blair’s response to his concerns had been
“non-committal”.548
941.  Mr Blair told the Inquiry that, although anxiety and concern were occasionally
flagged up very strongly in Sir Hilary’s reports from Basra, when Sir Hilary left Iraq he
was, on balance, optimistic rather than pessimistic.549
942.  Sir Hilary’s response to Mr Blair’s assessment is described later in this Section.
943.  Mr Nixon offered his first impressions from Basra on 24 February (after some
three weeks in post as Head of CPA(South)).550 He described himself as “guardedly
optimistic”. Economic activity was increasing and there was an air of excitement around
the political process.
944.  CPA(South) now had “almost a full house of specialist experts” and was working
closely with MND(SE). By the end of February, CPA(South) would have committed
US$280m to more than 1,300 projects designed to create jobs, make a quick and visible
545  Minutes, 12 February 2004, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation meeting.
546  Paper FCO, [undated], ‘Future UK Representation in Iraq’.
547  Letter Cannon to Owen, 17 February 2004, ‘Iraq: Sir Hilary Synnott’.
548  Letter Synnott to Aldred, 24 January 2011, [untitled].
549  Public hearing, 21 January 2011, page 135.
550  Telegram 19 CPA Basra to FCO London, 24 February 2004, ‘First Impressions from Basra’.
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