4.3  |  Iraq WMD assessments, October 2002 to March 2003

457.  Mr Scarlett pointed out that:

“Evidence of past possession is not, of course, enough. Indeed it could itself

engender rumour and speculation in Iraq that might be fed back to us as fact.

(Some opposition and defector material may be suspect on these grounds.)”

458.  Referring to the Government’s assessment of Iraq’s WMD published on

24 September 2002, Mr Scarlett wrote: “our judgement … draws on a range of

well‑sourced intelligence” falling under three main headings:

“• SIGINT [signals intelligence] has provided extensive material relating to

procurement activities particularly in the missile and UAV field. Some of

this has led to a number of interdictions of missile material. Procurement

of dual‑use items that could be related to CBW and nuclear programmes has

also been noted.

• I  magery has also provided useful material in relation to the extensive

reconstruction of the Iraq’s [sic] missile infrastructure, such as the identification

of the al-Rafah Test Stand and the al-Mamoun solid fuel facility. Because many

chemical and biological facilities are dual-use, it is difficult for imagery to provide

proof of the existence of a CBW programme. For this reason we have not relied

on imagery in supporting our case that Iraq has a CBW programme.

• H  UMINT [human intelligence] has provided clear and consistent reporting

relating to Iraq’s continuing WMD programmes …”

459.  Mr Scarlett added that HUMINT came “from a variety of sources”:

“• SIS have a number of well placed and reliable sources […] [with high-level

access in Iraq] and have been able to report on the regime’s WMD policy, its

plans for use and its extensive concealment efforts. SIS also have a number of

sources who report from closer to the programmes.

• Some of these have provided a consistent picture of Iraq’s missile programme

(including extension of Al Samoud and the existence of Al Husseins).

• Intelligence on CBW programmes has been less complete but indicates

continued production of CBW agents after UNSCOM’s departure.

• CIA and other foreign intelligence agencies (the mobile BW production

laboratories originated from […]).

• DIS … reporting, relating to Iraq’s long range missile programme.”

460.  Mr Scarlett wrote that Sir David Manning was “familiar with the main conclusions

from intelligence”.

461.  Addressing Saddam Hussein’s behaviour, Mr Scarlett wrote:

“The picture from past possession and from intelligence is further reinforced by

Saddam’s current behaviour. He has been given clear opportunities to avoid

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