3.8 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 8 to 20 March
2003
649.
In response to
a letter from Mr Atal Vajpayee, the Prime Minister of
India,
proposing a
summit-level meeting of the leaders of the five Permanent Members
of
the Security
Council about the situation in Iraq, Mr Blair
wrote:
“… the
current situation in Iraq poses many challenges for the
international
community.
How we handle this issue will have wide-ranging global
implications
for many
years to come. It is for this reason that we and other UNSC members
are
working so
hard to secure a peaceful resolution.
“I am
conscious that all P5 members have a duty to do everything within
their power
to resolve
this issue without eroding the authority of the UN system. I am
meeting
my US and
Spanish counterparts on 16 March in the hope that a way can be
found
to bridge
the differences within the Security Council. I hope that the UK and
India will
keep in
very close touch as the situation develops.”221
650.
In a
discussion with President Lagos about the Chilean proposal, the
position of
the
“elected six” and the position of the US and other members of the
Security Council,
Mr Blair
said that there were concerns that the “elected six” document would
be “used
by the
French to cause further delay”.222
Time was
running out. It was clear from his
conversation
with President Chirac the previous day that France “would still not
accept
the
automatic use of force or an ultimatum in the event of
non-compliance”.
651.
President
Lagos stated that benchmarks without a timeline would result
in
endless
discussion, but it was not clear what the Security Council could do
and time was
running
out. Secretary Powell had told the Mexican Foreign Minister that
the US did not
want any
further movement at the UN.
652.
President
Lagos was reported to have stated that he:
“… had
acted in good faith, but he would not do anything further. He was
very mad
with the US
response. They had assumed motives that were not
true.”
653.
Mr Blair
said he would have further discussions with the US and “there could
be
a chance to
squeeze things through”; and that “he thought there was still time
and he
would keep
trying until the last minute”.
654.
President
Lagos responded that Mr Blair “knew where Chile stood and he
was
sorry that
they had not been able to achieve a successful outcome last
week”.
655.
Mr Blair
wrote in his memoir that the six tests tabled by the UK on 12
March:
“… were
immediately rejected by France. Jacques Chirac gave a very
strong
statement
saying he would not support military action whatever the
circumstances.
Dominique
de Villepin … also then rejected the tests per se. This was
before
221
Letter
Blair to Vajpayee, 15 March 2003, [untitled].
222
Letter
[Francis] Campbell to McDonald, 15 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Chile, 15
March’.
511