17 |
Civilian casualties
277.
The Inquiry
considers that a Government has a responsibility to make
every
reasonable
effort to identify and understand the likely and actual effects of
its military
actions on
civilians.
278.
That will
include not only direct civilian casualties, but also the indirect
costs on
civilians
arising from worsening social, economic and health conditions.
(Section 10.4
considers
the scale of the reconstruction challenge in Iraq after the fall of
Saddam
Hussein’s
regime and the Government’s contribution to meeting that
challenge).
279.
It may not be
possible, before committing to a course of action, to produce
even
broad
estimates of the number of civilians that would be directly and
indirectly affected
by it, or
to identify all the effects on civilians.
280.
The Government
should be ready to work with others, in particular NGOs
and
academic
institutions, to develop such assessments and estimates over
time.
281.
The Government
should take account of those assessments and estimates
in
developing
its strategy and plans as well as in its military tactics and use
of ordnance, in
order to
minimise, to the extent possible, the effects on civilians. The
Inquiry considers
that RAND’s
conclusion in relation to US military operations should apply
equally to
the UK:
“Because
protecting the population is one of the central tenets of US
COIN
[counter‑insurgency]
doctrine … Iraqi civilian fatalities should be a chief concern
for
282.
As well as
serving to minimise the effect of military action on civilians,
such
assessments
and estimates will also enable the Government to address criticisms
of the
human cost
of military operations.
169
RAND,
2008. An Argument
for Documenting Casualties: Violence Against Iraqi Civilians
2006.
219