The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
Airport]
and Basra Air Station. Future challenges include the shrinking of
the
International
Zone [in Baghdad], the gradual transfer of responsibility for
security
to the
Iraqi forces and Transition in MND(SE). We continually assess and
evaluate
these
changes and will not hesitate to recommend changes to the
establishment
should we
deem them necessary, even at the expense of achieving our
objectives.
Both
missions have a robust Contingency Plan that can be invoked quickly
to
reduce
staff numbers. Having reviewed again the two missions I judge that
all
staff are
carrying out, or enabling others to carry out, jobs required of us
by our
clients in
the UK.”
393.
On 4 April,
Mr Tansley reported a “sustained and substantial” rocket and
mortar
attack on
the Basra Palace site during the Queen’s Birthday Party reception,
with one
salvo
hitting and damaging a building belonging to the British Embassy
Office.276
No
staff
were
injured. The attack was the fifth on the Basra Palace site in seven
days.
394.
FCO and DFID
officials put advice in parallel to Mr Straw and
Mr Benn,
recommending
a temporary reduction in the number of staff in Basra (five each
from
FCO and
DFID), to be reviewed after two weeks.277
395.
The IPU
explained to Mr Straw that the “security conditions generally
in Basra City
have made
it impossible for some staff to continue working effectively (the
key criterion
for their
presence)”. A review of staffing levels had concluded that it was
“debatable
whether the
benefits of retaining them are commensurate with the risks
faced”.
396.
At the ISG on
7 April, Sir Nigel Sheinwald observed that the drawdown of
civilian
staff from
the Basra Palace site was a significant development and asked the
FCO
and DFID to
“consult more widely than their respective Secretaries of
State”.278
The subsequent
advice to Ministers should make clear that:
“Set
against the issue of not keeping people somewhere they could not
operate,
there was
the problem of re‑entry [of civilian staff] and the political or
practical
fall‑out of
the UK being driven out of the Basra Palace by terrorists. A
decision
to locate
our civilian presence at the airport would represent a major
failure.”
397.
Sir Peter
Ricketts, UK Permanent Representative to NATO and FCO
PUS‑designate,
visited Baghdad and Basra from 5 to 7 April.279
In his
visit report on
10 April,
he endorsed the FCO recommendation.
398.
Sir Peter
described staff as “highly committed and motivated … well led
and
managed,
doing important work with great enthusiasm and
adaptability”.
276
eGram
9731/06 Basra to FCO London, 4 April 2006, ‘Iraq: Basra: Indirect
Fire Attack on Basra Palace’.
277
Minute Iraq
Policy Unit [junior official] to Private Secretary [FCO], 7 April
2006, ‘Basra: Security
of British
Embassy Office Situation’; Minute MENAD [junior official] to
PS/Secretary of State [DFID],
7 April 2006,
‘Basra Security Update and Contingency Plans’.
278
Minute
Cabinet Office [junior official] to Sheinwald, 10 April 2006, ‘Iraq
Strategy Group: 7 April 2006’.
279
Minute
Ricketts to Asquith, 10 April 2006, ‘Visit to Baghdad and
Basra’.
312