4.1  |  Iraq WMD assessments, pre-July 2002

The paper set out in considerable detail Iraq’s “blatant” obstruction of UN inspectors in

relation to its biological weapons programme. Iraq did not acknowledge that biological

agents had been produced “on an industrial scale” until July 1995. It also “admitted

producing in excess of 200 biological weapons with a reserve of agent to fill considerably

more”. Subsequent disclosures in relation to the programme were “technically inadequate”

and Iraq had refused to elaborate on the details.

The paper also set out the inspectors’ achievements in dismantling and destroying

Iraq’s proscribed weapons systems, but “a series of significant unresolved disarmament

issues remained”.

The paper stated the UK believed “that Iraq has pressed ahead with its WMD

programmes” since 1998; and that the heads of UNSCOM and the IAEA had “declared

that in the absence of inspections”, it was “impossible to verify Iraq’s compliance with

its … obligations”.

The paper concluded:

“In the interests of regional and global security, the international community cannot

allow this stand off to continue indefinitely.”

525.  In a report published on 20 June, the FAC recommended that the UK Government

should follow the precedent it had set in relation to Afghanistan, in October 2001, and:

“… publish the fullest possible documentation on the need for further military action,

before any such action is seriously contemplated. While nothing should be published

which might compromise sources or methods of intelligence, the Government must

try to secure the widest possible support in Parliament and among the British people

if it is proposing to risk the lives of British servicemen and women as part of a further

phase of the war against terrorism.”227

526.  In mid-July, No.10 officials decided that publication should be put on hold for

the time being.

527.  During questions on Iraq from the Liaison Committee on 16 July (see Section 3.3),

Mr Blair replied that “as far as he was aware there was no evidence linking Saddam

Hussein to the actual attack on 11 September”; and that there were “various rough

linkages” to Al Qaida; but the issue (on Iraq) was “weapons of mass destruction. It is not

what happened on 11 September or the Al Qaida terrorist network.”228

528.  Asked what had changed since President Bush took office, Mr Blair replied:

“… First … it is clear that Saddam Hussein is still trying to develop weapons of

mass destruction. Secondly … weapons inspectors where he is still refusing to

227  Seventh Report from Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 2001-2002, Foreign Policy Aspects of the War

against Terrorism, HC 384, paragraph 233.

228  Minutes, Liaison Committee (House of Commons), 16 July 2002, [Evidence Session], Qs 97-98.

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