The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
technical
experts in SIS “knew the Iraqi story intimately”. If they “said we
know about this
chap, we
know about the account of his past, if he’s possibly in touch with
us and going
to send us
stuff, that’s a very major development”.218
574.
SIS4 added
that it was “potentially a very, very serious
breakthrough”.219
575.
SIS4 told the
Inquiry that Sir Richard Dearlove had not, in his view,
“acted
unprofessionally”
in briefing Mr Blair about the 11 September report. He had had
“to take
all these
political decisions on his own shoulders” and those
were:
“Heavy
responsibilities.
“He judged
that Blair needed to know, and he told him. I don’t think he did a
wrong
thing. The
style may be questioned, but I don’t think he was wrong to do what
he did.
….
“… the
analysis and motivation at the time … stands.”220
576.
Asked why
Mr Blair was under the impression when he gave evidence to
the
Hutton
Inquiry that the process of validation was still continuing, SIS4
told the Inquiry:
“I think
that was one of life’s ghastlinesses. I don’t think the withdrawal
notice was
sent to
Number 10 because withdrawal notices are not major new
intelligence.
They are
not the sort of thing ministers get up early to read. What they do
affect,
importantly,
is the integrity of the record.
“I imagine
that the requirements officer issuing the withdrawal report …
thought,
‘They won’t
be interested in this’. How wrong he was, and what a skid-up within
just
a few days,
when the Prime Minister said at a public inquiry something that
was
probably
not the case.221
It’s very
embarrassing.”222
577.
Asked whether
that was, “A cock-up rather than a conspiracy”, SIS4
replied:
“Always.”
218
Private
hearing, Part 1, pages 56-57.
219
Private
hearing, Part 1, page 60.
220
Private
hearing, Part 1, page 62.
221
Mr Blair
did not make such a statement to the Hutton Inquiry. The statement
that he had not known
about the
withdrawal of the reporting when he had given evidence to the
Hutton Inquiry on 28 August 2003
was made by
his Spokesman on 16 July 2004. The National Archives,
Press
Briefing: 11am Friday
16 July
2004.
222
Private
hearing, Part 1, pages 67-68.
390