The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
63.
Mr Browne
considered that it should be possible to conclude the training
of
14 Division
by the end of 2008 and thereafter, should the UK so decide, to
declare an
end to Op
TELIC and a move to a longer-term bilateral relationship with Iraq,
requiring
hundreds
rather than thousands of troops. The timing of such a shift would
fit with both
provincial
elections and the expiry of resolution 1790. Even before UK troops
departed,
Mr Browne
pointed out that by October the US would have three times as much
combat
power as
the UK in MND(SE).
64.
In conclusion,
Mr Browne said that he would work with Mr Miliband
and
Mr Alexander
“as a matter of urgency on the narrative that will put in context
our
withdrawal
of combat troops, and explain what we have achieved since
2003”.
65.
At the start
of June, Australian and Czech troops left MND(SE).20
Maj Gen
White-
Spunner
observed that, with the imminent departure of the
Romanians:
“Our
Multi-National Division is now not as multi-national as it once
was, being …
essentially
UK and US – not forgetting the two Romanians and one Lithuanian
in
this headquarters.”
66.
On 7 June,
Mr Prentice reported to the FCO on a briefing from Ambassador
David
Satterfield,
State Department Co-ordinator for Iraq, covering developments in
negotiating
the US/Iraq
Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and Strategic Framework
Agreement
(SFA).21
The US
aimed to have both signed by 31 July, coming into effect at the
start
of 2009,
and had almost reached agreement on the SFA. The SOFA had been set
aside
in favour
of a new “Implementing Arrangement” in the form of a protocol to
the SFA.
67.
Mr Prentice
reported that the US were “now settling for a degree of operational
and
legal risk
and there will be no chance of us being able to negotiate legally
watertight
authorities
or privileges and immunities which go beyond what the US
accept”.
68.
Uncertainty
remained over whether any eventual UK/Iraqi agreement would
be
subject to
separate Iraqi Government and/or Council of Representative
approval.
Mr Prentice
observed that the more the UK sought distinct arrangements, the
more
risk there
would be of particular political attention:
“There may
also be some temptation to ‘go after’ the junior coalition
partner;
post‑Basra,
there are still anti-British rumours in the corridors
…”
69.
In his weekly
report on 9 June, Lt Gen Cooper wrote that:
“The key
political issue this week has been the bursting into print and
speech by
many
observers and politicians on the SFA/SOFA. Earlier in the week,
most parties
declared
some form of opposition to the SFA or very qualified and
conditional
support
based on significant caveats … As the week wore on, several
senior
20
Minute
White-Spunner to CJO, 6 June 2008, ‘MND(SE) Weekly Letter – 06 June
2008’.
21
eGram
22049/08 Baghdad to FCO London, 7 June 2008, ‘Iraq: SFA/SoFA
Negotiations’.
392