15.2 |
Conclusions: Civilian personnel
6.
The Government
had no pre-existing machinery for recruiting and deploying at
speed
large
numbers of civilians with the appropriate skills. As a result,
efforts to deploy larger
numbers of
civilians to Iraq fell well short of targets.
7.
There was a
particular shortage of Arabic speakers and reconstruction
expertise.
8.
From late
summer 2003, concern about staff safety led to the
progressive
introduction
of protective security measures for civilian personnel in Iraq and
placed
additional
constraints on civilian deployments.
9.
Government
departments recognised their duty of care obligations to
personnel
working in
Iraq. Significant effort and resources went into keeping staff
safe.
10.
In the absence
of a government-wide approach to risk or an effective
framework
for
assessing the value of civilian personnel in a highly insecure
environment, the
Government
struggled to establish a co-ordinated approach to the
deployment
of civilians.
11.
The Iraq
Reconstruction Service Medal and the Locally Engaged Staff
Assistance
Scheme were
appropriate responses to the issues they addressed.
12.
Sections 6.4
and 6.5 address the UK’s pre-invasion planning and
preparation
for its
role in the Occupation of Iraq. In the absence of effective
cross-government
machinery
for drawing together all aspects of planning and preparation, the
Foreign and
Commonwealth
Office (FCO), the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and the Department
for
International
Development (DFID) pursued broadly complementary objectives, but
did so
separately.
This left significant gaps in UK civilian capabilities that were
overlooked.
13.
The UK did not
plan or prepare for the deployment of more than a handful
of
civilians
to Iraq, other than in direct support of military
operations.
14.
The FCO was
not equipped by past experience or practice, or by its limited
human
and
financial resources, to prepare for nation-building of the scale
required in Iraq, and
did not
expect to do so.
15.
The FCO did
make effective preparations, however, for resuming
diplomatic
representation
in Baghdad. The British Office Baghdad opened, on schedule,
on
5 May 2003.
16.
DFID was
reluctant, before the invasion, to engage in planning and
preparation for
anything
other than the immediate humanitarian response to
conflict.
17.
DFID did,
however, make pre-conflict preparations to support those
multilateral
institutions
providing humanitarian assistance in Iraq and the
region.
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