1.2 |
Development of UK strategy and options, September 2000 to September
2001
contain the
threat that Iraq poses to its neighbours … while at the same time
addressing
the
humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people”.181
330.
On 12 February
2001, Mr Brummell had written to Mr McKane:
•
confirming
that Lord Williams accepted “that it is still possible
on balance
to
argue that
the maintenance of the No-Fly Zones is justified as a necessary
and
proportionate
use of force to prevent a humanitarian crisis”;
•
emphasising
“that it is vitally important to keep constantly in view the
precarious
nature of
the legal basis for UK and US action in the No-Fly Zones”;
and
•
asking for
an “update of the situation in the north and south of
Iraq,
consideration
of alternatives to the maintenance of the Zones, and
information
on any
civilian casualties associated with UK and US operations in
relation to
the Zones”,
by the end of May 2001.
331.
That letter is
described earlier in this Section.
332.
The production
of the update was delayed by the UK General Election in June
2001.
After the
election, Lord Goldsmith of Allerton became the Attorney
General.
333.
Mr McKane
wrote to Mr Brummell on 28 June, to provide the
update.182
He
advised
that there
was no evidence that would entail a revision of the assessment that
he had
provided on
8 February (and which had been endorsed by Mr Cook and Mr Straw),
but
offered an
update on the points made in that letter:
“Although
we cannot predict with absolute certainty how Saddam would react
in
the event
of a cessation of coalition operations in the southern No-Fly Zone,
our
judgement
remains that he would revert to the use of air power against
the
Shia
population …
“… more
effective persecution of the Shia would add to their misery and
would risk
provoking
another cycle of uprising and brutal repression. A grave
humanitarian
crisis
would result …
“There is
no reason to call into question the JIC judgement … that abolition
of the
northern
No-Fly Zone would be likely to lead to a refugee crisis at least
comparable
to 1996
(nor that, in the event that Saddam faced widespread opposition to
an
assault to
recover the north, a humanitarian refugee crisis similar to that in
1991
would
follow).
181
Letter
Prime Minister to Khatami, 30 July 2001, [untitled].
182
Letter
McKane to Brummell, 28 June 2001, ‘Iraq’.
255