5 |
Advice on the legal basis for military action, November 2002 to
March 2003
co‑sponsors,
deserves to be given the same weight as a view which in effect
hands
the F/R/C
the very legal prize they failed to achieve in the negotiation of
1441.”
415.
Mr Straw
told the Inquiry that he had “spent some time drafting” his letter
to
Lord Goldsmith,
and that:
“Obviously
I’m pretty certain that Sir Jeremy Greenstock would have seen the
draft
and his
legal adviser Iain Macleod, certainly Peter Ricketts … But … I then
put it
together
from the negotiating history …”161
416.
Lord
Goldsmith was asked on 4 February for urgent advice on a
second
resolution
determining that Iraq had failed to take the final opportunity
offered
in resolution
1441.
417.
Following a
number of bilateral contacts about the nature of the second
resolution,
Mr Grainger
wrote to Ms Adams on 4 February warning that the indications were
that
some key
Security Council members, “such as France”, might not be persuaded
that
the Council
should adopt even an “implicit” resolution that mentioned material
breach.
Mr Grainger
sought Lord Goldsmith’s views “as soon as possible” on the
elements
of a second
resolution necessary to make clear that Iraq had failed to take the
final
opportunity
provided in resolution 1441 and that serious consequences would
follow.162
418.
After
rehearsing the key provisions of OPs 1, 2, 4, 11, 12 and 13,
Mr Grainger
wrote:
“… the
relationship between these various paragraphs is a matter of
some
complexity.
It is however clear that the serious consequences which the
Council
has
repeatedly warned Iraq it will face as a result of its continued
violations of
its
obligations … are to occur in the context of paragraph 12 – that is
following
consideration
of the situation by the Council in accordance with that
paragraph.
The
consideration … can take place only when a report – either of a
material
breach
under paragraph 4, or of the interference or failure to comply
mentioned
in paragraph
11 – has been made.
“In our
view once Council consideration has taken place, a specific
reference to
material
breach is not required in any decision by the Council: what is
necessary
is that
the Council should conclude that the serious consequences for Iraq
referred
to in
paragraph 13 are triggered. If the Council has considered a report
under
paragraph
4, the finding of material breach will be implicit. If … the
Council has
considered
a report under paragraph 11, it will be clear that the new
enhanced
inspections
regime has not worked and therefore the material breach finding
in
paragraph 1
is still operative.”
161
Public
hearing, 8 February 2010, page 30.
162
Letter
Grainger to Adams, 4 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Second
Resolution’.
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