The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
134.
Mr Blair was
reported to have said that he hoped that it “won’t come to this”
and
that this
“will happen mid-February to early March”. Mr Blair’s final comment
was that
this was
the “best chance we have got”; it was his “strong view that we
wouldn’t be
looking
much past the end of February before seeing this take
place”.
135.
Adm Boyce’s
briefing notes identified “two essential points” in relation to
whether
or not the
US had a winning concept:
•
The need
for Saddam Hussein to believe that force would be
overwhelming
and that he
could not survive in power, while, in parallel, giving genuine
hope
to Iraqis
who opposed his regime that an end was possible.
•
Coalition
military action would need to be “swift” to avoid a “drawn out
campaign
…
becoming a battle of
attrition conducted against backdrop of dwindling
public
support”; to prevent
Saddam using “spoiling
tactics such as
use
of WMD, or
causing an ecological disaster by torching the oil fields”;
and
“to
minimise the risk of unintended consequences”.
136.
Adm Boyce’s
briefing notes offered no indication of the MOD’s view on
whether
the
objectives could be met.
137.
The PJHQ
record of the meeting reported that Mr Blair had asked “will
it
[the
military plan] work?”38
138.
Adm Boyce
“stated that it would”; he had increasing confidence in the plan
“since
TU [Turkey]
had become more engaged in discussions” about allowing US forces
to
attack from
the north.
139.
Asked whether
success would be the collapse of the Iraqi regime or the
fall
of
Baghdad:
•
Adm Boyce
was reported to have explained to Mr Blair “the problem
of
‘catastrophic
success’ whereby the regime collapsed at the very outset”
before
the
Coalition was ready.
•
Mr Hoon’s
view was reported to have been that the media would view the fall
of
Baghdad as
the culmination of military operations.
140.
PJHQ also
reported that Mr Blair had:
•
focused on
the importance of a simultaneous air and ground campaign;
and
•
asked about
the cohesion of the regime and its chances of maintaining
control.
141.
Mr Blair
was concerned about the implications if Saddam Hussein sought
to
put in
place a “Fortress Baghdad” strategy and possible pre-emptive use of
WMD.
38
Minute
MA/DCJO(Ops) to MA/CJO, 15 Jan 2003, ‘Briefing to the Prime
Minister’.
406