The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
documentation
making clear that they are now assessed as being useable
up
until 2004.”
376.
The Chiefs of
Staff meeting on 19 February was advised that:
“… the US
definition of FOC [Full Operating Capability] was when a unit
achieved
80%
readiness. 7 Armd Bde would therefore be declared at FOC without
its full suite
of UORs.
CDS directed that Ministers be informed of this interpretation of
FOC so
that they
were not caught out on UOR issues.”185
377.
In
mid-February, the MOD told Mr Blair that British troops would
be
adequately
protected in the event of a BW or CW attack.
378.
A Joint
Intelligence Committee (JIC) Assessment on 19 February judged
that
southern
Iraq was “the most likely area for the first use of CBW against
both Coalition
Forces and
the local population” in the event of coalition military
action.186
It did
not
address the
likelihood of a CBW attack.
379.
On
20 February, Mr Blair asked the MOD for advice on a
number of detailed
questions
following the publication of a report on Iraq by the International
Institute of
Strategic
Studies.187
That paper
is addressed in detail in Section 6.5.
380.
One question
asked by Mr Blair was: “What is the prospect of a pre-emptive
BW or
CW attack
on our troops in Kuwait, and are we certain we are adequately
prepared and
our troops
protected?”
381.
The MOD
replied that Iraq retained the capability “(through a variety of
means) to
pre-emptively
deliver CBW against Coalition Forces in Kuwait”.188
The
question was “one
of intent”.
In the MOD’s view it remained “highly unlikely whilst Saddam
believes war
can be
averted”. If he was convinced that war was “inevitable and
imminent” that “might
make a
pre-emptive move more attractive” but it was “more likely that
Saddam would
deploy CBW
after the onset of the campaign”.
382.
The planned
levels of NBC defence equipment “should enable all troops
to
withstand
initial BW or CW attack”.
383.
The UOR update
on 21 February informed Lord Bach that 167 business cases
had
been
approved, accounting for “some £478m” of the £500m allocated by the
Treasury.189
Sustainability
UORs, at a total cost of £318m, had also been
approved.
185
Minutes,
19 February 2003, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
186
JIC
Assessment, 19 February 2003, ‘Southern Iraq: What’s in
Store?’.
187
Dodge T
& Simon S (eds). Iraq at the
Crossroads: State and Society in the Shadow of Regime
Change.
Adelphi
Paper 354 IIIS Oxford University Press January, 2003; Minute
Rycroft to McDonald, 20 February
2003,
‘Iraq: Political and Military Questions’.
188
Letter
Watkins to Rycroft, 24 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Political and
Military Questions’.
189
Minute
CM(SD) to PS/Minister(DP), 21 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Op TELIC
UORs’.
60