Executive
Summary
670.
To manage that
risk, the UK proposed a Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU)
with the US
to establish procedures for working together on issues related to
the
Occupation,
but it could not be agreed. Having supplied the overwhelming
majority of the
CPA’s
resources, the US had little incentive to give the UK an
influential role in deciding
how those
resources were to be used, and the UK lacked the will and leverage
to insist.
671.
In the absence
of formal arrangements, there was a clear risk that the UK
would
be
inadequately involved in important decisions, and the UK struggled
from the start
to have a
significant effect on the CPA’s policies. This was a source of
concern to both
Ministers
and officials in 2003, but the issue was never
resolved.
672.
Senior
individuals deployed to Iraq by the UK at this time saw themselves
either
as working
for the CPA in support of its objectives and as part of its chain
of command,
or as UK
representatives within the CPA with a remit to seek to influence
CPA decisions.
No‑one
formally represented the UK position within the CPA decision‑making
process,
a serious
weakness which should have been addressed at an early
stage.
673.
Managing a
joint occupation of such size and complexity effectively and
coherently
required
regular formal and informal discussion and clear decision‑making at
all levels,
both
between capitals and in‑country. Once attempts to agree an MOU had
failed, the
chances of
constructing such mechanisms were slim.
674.
In the absence
of an MOU with the US, the UK’s influence in Baghdad
depended heavily
on the personal impact of successive Special Representatives
and
British
Ambassadors to Iraq and the relationships they were able to build
with senior
US figures.
675.
Some instances
of important CPA decisions in which the UK played
little
or no formal
part were:
•
The
decision to issue CPA Order No.2, which “dissolved” (or disbanded)
a
number of
military and other security entities that had operated as part
of
Saddam
Hussein’s regime, including the armed forces (see Section 12).
This
was raised
informally by Ambassador Bremer in his first meeting with
Mr John
Sawers,
Mr Blair’s Special Representative on Iraq, who – unbriefed –
did not at
that point
take a contrary position. The concept of creating a new army had
also
been raised
by Mr Walt Slocombe, CPA Senior Adviser on National Security
and
Defense, in
discussion with Mr Hoon. Dissolution was a key decision which
was
to have a
significant effect on the alienation of the Sunni community and
the
development
of an insurgency in Iraq, and the terms and timing of this
important
Order
should have been approved by both Washington and
London.
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