3.3 |
Development of UK strategy and options,
April to July 2002
74.
In a
meeting with French officials, Mr Edward Chaplin, FCO Director
Middle
East and
North Africa, stated that a continuing threat of US action was
needed
to influence
Iraqi behaviour, whatever some might think of the
consequences
of the
threat.
75.
Following a
visit to Paris by Mr Chaplin, the British Embassy Paris reported
that
officials
in the French Foreign Ministry:
•
did not
expect much movement in Iraq’s third meeting with Mr Annan in
Vienna,
which was
best described as a dialogue not a negotiation;
•
were
looking to see how to raise the dialogue with Iraq to persuade it
to agree
the return
of inspectors but were sceptical about whether Iraq would agree
a
regime
similar to that which had applied until 1998;
•
took the
firm position that Iraq had to make clear its willingness to agree
the
return of
inspectors before talks on clarification of resolution 1284 (1999)
could
start;
•
were less
convinced than before that US military action was inevitable;
and
•
saw the
return of inspectors as the best way to avoid military action and
would
want to
maintain the unity of the P5 as the means to deliver
it.40
76.
In relation to
UN authority for military action, a French official
stated:
“… past
precedent demonstrated that formal authorisation by the UN was
not
an absolute
requirement for military action. What would be indispensable, as
a
minimum,
would be a statement by the Security Council (not necessarily in
the form
of a SCR
[Security Council resolution]) that Iraq was in breach of its
obligations,
and a
warning making clear to Iraq what the consequences of a continued
violation
would be.
The Quai had given this advice to Chirac [Mr Jacques Chirac,
President of
France] for
his meeting with Bush.”
77.
Another French
official stated that the US had no answer to the question of
what
would
happen “the day after”. The Kurds and Shia were ready to come in
behind the
US, but
would not go out ahead of them. The greatest fear of ordinary
Iraqis was what
would come
after Saddam Hussein “with or without US intervention”. The Shia
were in
a majority,
but there was no question of the leadership being anything other
than Sunni.
It was far
from clear that the Republican Guard would be able to keep control
if there
was a
change of regime.
78.
Mr Chaplin
argued that the best way to avoid military action was to
make
resolution 1284
a reality. The UK would follow Dr Blix on the procedures he
thought
necessary
for the inspectors to do their job: “But it was hard to see the US
agreeing to
40
Telegram
337 Paris to FCO London, 28 May 2002, ‘Iraq: Quai’s
Views’.
17