3.4 |
Development of UK strategy and options, late July to 14 September
2002
404.
The meeting at
Camp David was in two parts.130
405.
Mr Blair,
supported by Sir David Manning, discussed Iraq with President
Bush,
Vice President
Cheney and Dr Rice from 1600 to 1745. Sir David Manning
recorded that
it was a
“remarkable” meeting. President Bush had congratulated
Mr Blair on his speech
at
Sedgefield.
406.
During the
meeting, the arguments for taking the issue to the UN, the type
of
resolution,
the attitude of other members of the Security Council, the
relationship with
the MEPP,
and aspects of a military campaign and the “morning after”, were
discussed
in
depth.
407.
Mr Blair
said that he was in no doubt about the need to deal with Saddam
Hussein;
and that
the likelihood was that this would mean military action at some
point. The
immediate
issue was “how to maximise the chance of resolving the Saddam
dilemma
quickly and
cleanly”. It was possible that sustained pressure would lead to his
quick
collapse,
but “we could certainly not count on it”. That might “in part”
depend on “winning
the
propaganda battle” and securing wide international
support:
“If it came
to force, we could hope that we would secure the relatively
quick
overthrow
of Saddam. But even if we did, we would still be faced with the big
issue
of what
followed his departure.”
408.
There would be
even more difficult problems if Saddam Hussein did not
collapse
quickly. We
should not assume that there would be a quick collapse in Iraq as
there had
been with
the Taliban in Afghanistan.
409.
Mr Blair
stated that the position of the international community made it
important
to bring
the issue back to the UN and secure a new Security Council
resolution. Indeed,
two
resolutions might be necessary: one setting conditions and one
stipulating action
when Saddam
failed to meet them. Without a resolution, military action would
have little
or no
international backing.
410.
Later,
Mr Blair recognised that the two resolution route offered a
better chance of
setting
tough initial demands, but with a risk of difficulties in securing
a second resolution
authorising
action. In a discussion about how a breach would be established and
the
need to
avoid a long debate, Mr Blair said: “If Saddam was obviously
in breach we
would know,
and we had to be ready to move.” On balance, Mr Blair favoured
a tough
initial
resolution leaving open the option of going back to the UN for a
second resolution,
if and when
Saddam were in breach.
130
Minute
Manning to Prime Minister, 8 September 2002, ‘Your Visit to Camp
David on 7 September:
Conversation
with President Bush’.
163