The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
367.
The section on
“handling” in the previous draft had been expanded to
include
“NGOs”:
“The
announcement [of] any drawdown of UK forces in the South will have
to
be
carefully managed to ensure that there is no loss of confidence by
NGOs
(in particular
the UN agencies and the World Bank), which might lead them
to
postpone
plans for greater engagement in Iraq.”
368.
The section on
resources had also been expanded:
“Other
Government Departments operating in Iraq may … face increased
security
costs as
they are forced to seek commercial alternatives to military force
protection.”
369.
DOP(I) agreed
Dr Reid’s recommendation that, subject to the continuation
of
current
trends in the capacity of the Iraqi security forces and to there
being no major
deterioration
in the security situation, the UK should plan to implement
transition to Iraqi
control in
Maysan and Muthanna from around October 2005, and in Dhi Qar and
Basra
from around
March 2006.214
370.
DOP(I)
commented that too much of the money allocated for reconstruction
had
been spent
on foreign contractors and security.215
The UK
should now be focusing on
delivering
through Iraqi structures.
371.
DOP(I) also
considered an FCO paper entitled ‘Splitting the Jihadists from
the
National
Opposition’.216
The FCO
recommended action on eight “lines”, the last of which
was
reconstruction:
“Rapid
implementation of
reconstruction projects, specifically following large
scale
anti-insurgency
operations or local cease-fires:
“Aims:
Demonstrate ITG/MNF ability to rebuild and compensate
following
operations/cease-fires.
Quick support to Iraqi capacity to deliver. Installation of
basic
services.
Establishment of political and security structures. Employment
creation.
Deny
opportunity to insurgency to work up dissatisfaction.
“Means: …
Key donors and ITG to review how to reprogramme/redefine
donor
assistance
to make available rapidly disbursable aid (eg. creation of a
special fund
for quick
impact projects in politically sensitive areas), including from the
private
sector.
Media (foreign and Iraq) coverage of successful redevelopment
projects.”
372.
DOP(I) agreed
the “broad approach” set out in the FCO paper.217
214
Minutes, 21
July 2005, DOP(I) meeting; Paper
Secretary of State for Defence, 18 July 2005,
‘Operational
Transition in Iraq’.
215
Minutes, 21
July 2005, DOP(I) meeting.
216
Paper FCO,
18 July 2005, ‘Iraq: Splitting the Jihadists from the National
Opposition’; Minutes,
21 July 2005,
DOP(I) meeting.
217
Minutes, 21
July 2005, DOP(I) meeting.
258