The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
President
Bush stated that Iraq had an obligation to comply with the world’s
demands.
He added:
•
Failure to
provide “an accurate and full and complete accounting for all
chemical,
biological
and nuclear materials, as well as missiles and other means of
delivery
… would be
further indication of the regime’s bad faith and aggressive
intent”.
•
New and
effective rules were needed for inspections which Iraq “must accept
…
without
qualification or negotiation”.
•
The regime
must allow witnesses to be interviewed outside Iraq and take
their
entire
families with them.
President
Bush emphasised that the US was seeking to liberate and free Iraq
and its
people.
When it had “a government committed to the freedom and well‑being
of its
people”,
the US and other nations would “share a responsibility to help Iraq
reform and
prosper”.
He pledged that the US would meet those
responsibilities.
President
Bush concluded:
“… those
risks only increase with time. And the costs would be immeasurably
higher
in years to
come.
“To shrink
from that threat would bring a false sense of temporary peace
…
“The
terrorist attacks of last year put our country on notice … This
nation will not live
at the
mercy of any foreign power or plot. Confronting grave dangers is
the surest
path to
peace and security …
“The broad
resolve of our government is now clear to all … We will defend our
nation,
and lead
others in defending peace.”
462.
On 14
October, Mr Blair and President Bush discussed progress on
the
draft resolution
and the need to find common ground with France.
463.
Mr Blair
told President Bush that if, in the event of a breach there
were
no action
in the UN, the US and UK should take action.
464.
Following a
conversation with Dr Rice on 12 October, Sir David Manning
reported
that
discussions between the US and France were continuing but the US
Administration
was
determined to resolve the wording of the resolution the following
week.162
He
and
Dr Rice
also discussed:
•
Dr Blix’s
insistence on independence and legitimacy and the need to
ensure
he did
not underestimate the tricks Saddam Hussein would play and the
efforts
he would
make to obstruct the inspectors.
•
Whether
Saddam Hussein might refuse to allow the inspections to go
ahead
which
“would be a casus belli”. The regime might collapse once
rigorous
inspections
were taking place.
162
Letter
Manning to McDonald, 12 October 2002, ‘Iraq: Conversation with
Condi Rice’.
284