3.7 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March
2003
539.
In his monthly
press conference the following day, Mr Blair made an
opening
statement
setting out the “basic case” for the international community’s
response
540.
The points
made by Mr Blair included:
•
Saddam
Hussein was “a threat” whose actions over the last 12 years
made
him unique.
•
The stance
taken by the world against Saddam was “not just vital in its
own
right”, it
was “a huge test of our seriousness in dealing with the twin
threats
of weapons
of mass destruction and terrorism”.
•
If the UN was
“to keep credibility, it must act to implement its stated
will”.
•
It was
“plain in our judgement that Saddam” continued to be “in
breach”.
No country
at the European Council had disputed that his
co-operation
was “neither
unconditional nor complete”.
•
There was
“no rush to war”. It was “over three months” since Saddam
Hussein
had been
given a final opportunity to comply. But without a change of heart,
the
inspectors
were “never going to be able to play detective to search out
weapons
hidden in a
country” the size of Iraq.
•
The basis
for action was disarmament.
•
The
demonstrators on 15 February had “a rightful hatred of the
consequences
of war”,
but they should “also listen to the voices of some of the four
million Iraqi
exiles”.
The nature of the regime could not itself provide justification for
war, it
could “at
least show why if we do have to take military action, we do so in
the
sure
knowledge that we are removing one of the most barbarous and
detestable
regimes in
modern political history”.
•
People were
against a war which they felt was “rushed or unnecessary”
and
wanted to
know war was not inevitable. Saddam Hussein could avoid war if
he
co-operated
fully and that was the “reasonable and easily delivered
requirement”
of the
international community.
541.
Asked if he
reserved the right to go to war without a majority in the UN,
Mr Blair
stated that
there were “certain situations in which you have simply got to say
to people
look this
is what I believe and this is what I think is right”. He added that
there were
“certain
issues, particularly where there are issues of life and death,
where I think the job
and duty of
the Prime Minister is to say to people what you honestly think, and
then they
have got to
make up their minds”.
542.
Mr Blair
subsequently stated that he did not believe that he would be in a
position
where there
was no majority in the Security Council, and he did not want to
indulge
in speculation
on that point.
149
The
National Archives, 19 February 2003, PM press
conference 18 February transcript.
277