11.1 |
De-Ba’athification
155.
The presiding
judge advised all 12 of the crimes they were accused of
having
committed.
Mr Chris Segar, Head of the British Office Baghdad, reported
that:
“… under
Iraqi law this was a first step in which the accused is informed
that there
are
allegations against him which deserve investigation, which allow
for continued
detention
and that he has a right to legal counsel.”
156.
On 2 July, the
Cabinet Office Assessments Staff told Sir Nigel Sheinwald,
Mr Blair’s
Foreign
Policy Adviser, that there were indications that former Ba’athist
groups were
planning
targeted attacks on Iraqi Government ministers.132
157.
On 5 July, the
Assessments Staff provided Sir Nigel with statistics on the
number
of attacks
against the Multi‑National Force (MNF) and Iraqi
targets.133
It was too
early
to judge
the lasting impact of creating the IIG on the security
situation.
158.
On 12 July,
Mr Hoshyar Zebari, the new Iraqi Foreign Minister, told a
meeting of
EU Foreign
Ministers that:
“The
original policy of de‑Ba’athification has been right but too
generalised. He had
ex‑Ba’athists
in his ministry though not those who had been involved in
intelligence
or
atrocities. Ex‑Ba’athist insurgents were now in isolated groups.
They did not
represent a
coherent force.”134
159.
In one if its
regular assessments of security in Iraq, the JIC judged on 21 July
that
Prime
Minister Allawi had achieved only limited success in his attempts
to bring former
Ba’athists
“on board”.135
In the
absence of a single Ba’athist organisation with which
to
negotiate, that would remain the case. Reports of plans to carry
out assassinations,
including
of IIG members, continued.
160.
In early
August, Prime Minister Allawi signed an order that offered amnesty
to
those who
had played more minor roles in Iraq’s insurgency between 1 May 2003
and
7 August
2004.136
Mr Asquith
reported:
“Amnesty is
only provided to Iraqis and only for a limited number
of
terrorism‑associated
crimes: possession of certain firearms and explosives,
the harbouring
of terrorists or the failure to inform the authorities of
known
terrorist groups.”
132
Minute
Dowse to Sheinwald, 2 July 2004, ‘Iraq Update – 2
July’.
133
Minute
Dowse to Sheinwald, 5 July 2004, ‘Iraq Attack
Statistics’.
134
Telegram
COREU CFSP/Sec/1509/04, 12 July 2004, ‘COMIN‑COPOL – Foreign
Ministers’ Lunch with
Iraqi
Foreign Minister Mr Zibari’.
135
JIC
Assessment, 21 July 2004, ‘Iraq Security’.
136
Telegram
112 Baghdad to FCO London, 9 August 2004, ‘Iraq: Amnesty Law and
Death Penalty
Announced’.
33