10.2 |
Reconstruction: July 2004 to July 2009
effectively.
So we basically got together and decided that’s what we were going
to
do and
worked it from there.” 587
1001.
Maj Gen Salmon
told the Inquiry that JRATs were one expression of
that
integrated
approach, combining personnel from the PRT and MND(SE) working to
a
1002.
Lieutenant
General Peter Wall, Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff
(Commitments),
updated the
11 September meeting of the ISG on the emerging plan for UK
military
drawdown
and transition to US command in southern Iraq.589
He said
that:
•
At the end
of November 2008, command of Maysan, Muthanna and
Dhi-Qar
provinces
would transfer to an expanded MND(C), under US
command.
•
At the end
of March 2009, command of Basra would transfer to a
new
Basra‑based
US division, bringing UK forces there under US
command.
•
At the
start of May 2009, US forces would begin to deploy to
Basra.
•
By the end
of June 2009, the UK departure would be complete.
1003.
Mr Brown
and Mr Browne met the Chiefs of Staff and Sir Bill Jeffrey,
MOD
Permanent
Secretary, on 18 September.590
ACM Stirrup
reported that “remarkable
progress”
had been made in Iraq over the past 18 months, though it was
“fragile and
reversible”.
In the South, the biggest risk was stalled economic
progress.
1004.
Mr Brown
said that it would be important to have projects that helped
with
employment
in place before the UK left Basra, and to establish a UKTI presence
there.
The main
obstacle was not security but the business climate.
1005.
Mr Alexander
visited Baghdad and Basra on 6 November.591
The British
Embassy
Baghdad
reported that, in his meeting with Mr Alexander, Prime
Minister Maliki had
continued
to insist that the UK had done little for Basra, and questioned
whether the
Basra
Development Forum had led to any tangible progress. Prime Minister
Maliki
welcomed
Mr Alexander’s assurances that the UK wanted to move towards a
more
normal
bilateral relationship including closer economic, cultural and
educational links.
1006.
Mr Alexander
also met Ambassador Crocker. The two men agreed that the
US
would take
over the leadership of the Basra PRT as part of the UK/US
transition in Basra
587
Public
hearing, 20 July 2010, pages 27-28.
588
Public
hearing, 20 July 2010, pages 34-35.
589
Minute
Cabinet Office [junior official] to McDonald, 15 September 2008,
‘Iraq Strategy Group,
11 September’.
590
Letter
Catsaras to Rimmer, 18 September 2008, ‘Prime Minister’s Meeting
with Defence Chiefs,
18 September’.
591
eGram
45112/08 Baghdad to FCO London, 12 November 2008, ‘Iraq: Visit by
Secretary of State for
International
Development to Baghdad and Basra, 6 November’.
359