4.1 |
Iraq WMD assessments, pre-July 2002
“Before the
[1991] Gulf War intervened, Iraqi plans were well advanced and
we
judge they
were only three years away from possessing a nuclear
weapon.
“Were
sanctions lifted now, we judge it would take Iraq at least five
years to produce
a nuclear
weapon and a further two to produce a warhead.
“The
acquisition of fissile material or significant technical assistance
from abroad
could
significantly shorten this timescale.
“Iraq still
has some low grade radioactive material which it could utilise in
a
radiological
dispersal device, but there is no recent intelligence indicating
that Iraq is
pursuing
such a course.”
“…
even if
inspectors were allowed to return, Iraq would embark on a
renewed
policy of
frustration, involving
denial, deception, obstruction and delay. Iraq would
be able to
conceal from inspectors much of its CBW work and research on
longer
range
missiles, though probably not its missile production
facilities.”
“… if
Saddam believed he was unable to deter a US attack to oust his
regime, we
judge he
would go down fighting and could adopt high risk options, such as …
using
weapons of
mass destruction against US forces or Israel.”
190.
The shortening
of the timescale that Iraq would require to produce
significant
quantities
of BW agent from “weeks” in the JIC Assessment of May 2001 to
“days”
was significant.
191.
The Butler
Report stated that continuing reports on Iraqi mobile biological
agent
production
facilities, which were received from a liaison service, had had a
significant
impact on
the Assessment.94
The Butler
Review had been told that was “based on a
more
thorough understanding of the capabilities of the mobile production
facilities, and
on [the]
refurbishment of an Iraqi facility” which had been involved in
research and
biological
agent production before the Gulf Conflict.
192.
Other evidence
on this point, in the context of the Assessment of 15 March,
is
addressed
later in this Section.
193.
Mr Simon
Webb, MOD Policy Director, advised Mr Geoff Hoon, the
Defence
Secretary,
that Saddam Hussein was “the strategic centre of gravity” of
Iraq’s
WMD
programmes.
94
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The
Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,
paragraphs
244-245.
49