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4.1  |  Iraq WMD assessments, pre-July 2002
“Before the [1991] Gulf War intervened, Iraqi plans were well advanced and we
judge they were only three years away from possessing a nuclear weapon.
“Were sanctions lifted now, we judge it would take Iraq at least five years to produce
a nuclear weapon and a further two to produce a warhead.
“The acquisition of fissile material or significant technical assistance from abroad
could significantly shorten this timescale.
“Iraq still has some low grade radioactive material which it could utilise in a
radiological dispersal device, but there is no recent intelligence indicating that Iraq is
pursuing such a course.”
188.  The JIC judged:
“… even if inspectors were allowed to return, Iraq would embark on a renewed
policy of frustration, involving denial, deception, obstruction and delay. Iraq would
be able to conceal from inspectors much of its CBW work and research on longer
range missiles, though probably not its missile production facilities.”
189.  The JIC concluded:
“… if Saddam believed he was unable to deter a US attack to oust his regime, we
judge he would go down fighting and could adopt high risk options, such as … using
weapons of mass destruction against US forces or Israel.”
190.  The shortening of the timescale that Iraq would require to produce significant
quantities of BW agent from “weeks” in the JIC Assessment of May 2001 to “days”
was significant.
191.  The Butler Report stated that continuing reports on Iraqi mobile biological agent
production facilities, which were received from a liaison service, had had a significant
impact on the Assessment.94 The Butler Review had been told that was “based on a
more thorough understanding of the capabilities of the mobile production facilities, and
on [the] refurbishment of an Iraqi facility” which had been involved in research and
biological agent production before the Gulf Conflict.
192.  Other evidence on this point, in the context of the Assessment of 15 March, is
addressed later in this Section.
193.  Mr Simon Webb, MOD Policy Director, advised Mr Geoff Hoon, the Defence
Secretary, that Saddam Hussein was “the strategic centre of gravity” of Iraq’s
WMD programmes.
94  Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,
paragraphs 244-245.
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