9.3 |
July 2004 to May 2005
“I was
struck by the limited UK inputs beyond the relatively quiet
South-East.
The Americans
are pressing us again to provide troops in the main areas of
conflict,
though
General McColl saw problems in just putting a British battalion in
the middle
of a US
division. A better way might be to relieve the US of some areas
neighbouring
MND(SE). I
think we need to show some flexibility, and possibly increase
troop
numbers for
a period, if we are to keep a handle on US decisions and, albeit at
the
margins,
better complement the US effort on the ground. We also need to
think
through
what we should say about our longer term plans. We shall have to be
there
through
2005, but it would play helpfully in Iraq if we and Americans could
set a
target
date, say Spring 2006, when we would aim to draw down to a much
smaller
presence.
It would undercut those who say we want to occupy Iraq
indefinitely,
make Iraqi
political leaders face up to their responsibilities and might also
help us
domestically.
I would like to talk this through with you.”
187.
Mr William
Ehrman, Chairman of the JIC, visited Iraq alongside Mr
Straw.100
188.
Mr Ehrman
reported to Sir Nigel Sheinwald that security in Baghdad
was
deteriorating:
“The fact
that travel by road between the Green Zone and the airport is not
possible
after dusk
highlights this. The first IED in the Green Zone was discovered
while
I was
there. But I nonetheless returned encouraged by the clear efforts
of the IIG
to reach
out to the Sunni areas. They have not got a group of Sunnis there
publicly
to stand up
and support the IIG. But they are trying.”
189.
Mr Ehrman
judged that:
“To mount
an assault or not on Fallujah was the issue of the day … Fallujah
is no
Najaf or
Samarra where there were maybe 500 serious insurgents to deal
with.
In Fallujah
the estimate is 3-4,000 FRE [Former Regime Elements] and
another
500‑1,000
foreign fighters …”
190.
Mr Ehrman also
reported that the Head of the UN Election Assistance Mission
in
Iraq, Mr
Carlos Valenzuela, was “doing a good job on election preparations.
Despite lack
of
personnel, the technical work is on schedule.”
191.
Mr Straw
echoed that judgement in his report to Mr Blair, where he
wrote:
“I came
away reassured that elections in January were still doable, and
that the
deadline
was helping to force the pace.”101
192.
On 10 October,
Lt Gen McColl reported to Gen Walker and ACM Torpy on
the continuing
lack of clarity in US thinking on the future of the MNF-I after
the
January elections:
100
Minute
Ehrman to Sheinwald, 7 October 2004, ‘Visit to Baghdad, 4-6
October’.
101
Minute
Straw to Blair, 7 October 2004, ‘Iraq’.
427