The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
308.
An effective
burden‑sharing arrangement required the “political legitimacy”
that
would
follow UN endorsement of the transitional arrangement for governing
Iraq. If the
UN was
involved, the burden‑sharing arrangement should
comprise:
•
other
bilateral donors, with non‑combatant nations showing
“disproportionate
generosity”;
•
maximising
contributions from the IMF, the World Bank, other IFIs and the
EU;
•
preventing
Iraqi revenues being “side‑tracked” into paying debt
and
compensation
claims; and
•
maximising
Iraq’s own contribution from oil revenues.
309.
If the UN did
not endorse the transitional arrangements, many of those
approaches
would be
more difficult, and there would be pressure on the UK to contribute
more.
310.
The Treasury
advised:
“A
substantial UK financial contribution to the reconstruction efforts
is unlikely to
be
affordable within existing spending plans unless the [UK]
Government chose
to divert
spending from other domestic programmes. In the first instance
DFID’s
unallocated
departmental provision (£88m for 2003/04) should provide for
immediate
requirements.
The UK will, however, come under considerable pressure to
contribute
much more
as its share of immediate humanitarian and reconstruction costs,
let
alone what
would be required as part of an ‘exceptional response’.
Substantial
further
support from central funds though is unlikely to be affordable: the
costs
of military
activity in Iraq and elsewhere have already fully committed the
2003/04
Reserve;
and the overall deterioration in the fiscal position severely
limits the
Government’s
discretion to make additional spending allocations.”
311.
The 14 March
meeting of the AHGI was informed that the IPU was
considering
how best to
approach other donors for support on reconstruction, and that the
FCO was
considering
whether there was scope to approach other countries to contribute
to UK
military
campaign costs (though the prospects were not
good).183
312.
A junior
official in the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) wrote to the
MOD
on 5 March
to alert it to PJHQ’s concerns over the provision of humanitarian
assistance
in the UK
AO in the immediate aftermath of any conflict.184
PJHQ had
planned to
“piggy‑back”
on US arrangements for the provision of humanitarian relief. It was
now
apparent,
however, that the US plan depended heavily on international
organisations
and NGOs,
which were unlikely to be present in the first weeks after any
conflict.
183
Minute Dodd
to Manning, 17 March 2003, ‘Ad Hoc Group on Iraq’.
184
Minute PJHQ
[junior official] to MOD Sec(O) 4, 5 March 2003, ‘Op TELIC:
Resourcing of Humanitarian
Assistance’.
494