12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
1155.
The JIC
Assessment of 6 September included an update on ISF
performance.1089
It reported
that:
“We judge
Iraqi confidence, both among Ministers and more generally, has
been
damaged by
the popular perception that security has not significantly
improved.
“… The
government has taken some steps to address human rights abuses:
sacking
23 senior
National Police Commanders and disbanding an entire battalion
accused
of
complicity in sectarian acts. But other individuals accused of
sectarian abuses
remain in
positions of responsibility.”
With the
passage of time it was becoming increasingly difficult to know how
many police
officers
trained by CPATT were still employed by the MOI, or what percentage
of police on
the MOI
payroll were trained and equipped by CPATT.1090
That was
caused by a number
of factors:
•
the lack of an
effective personnel management system in the MOI;
•
a high
attrition rate (about 20 percent per year, with the MOI reporting
paying
death
benefits for more than 6,000 police officers since May 2003);
and
•
burgeoning
local recruitment.
Provincial
Governors had authority to hire more IPS officers than MNSTC‑I had
agreed
to train
and equip. In those areas, the MOI and the Provincial Governors
were responsible
for the
extra training and equipment requirements. As police were generally
unwilling to
move areas,
it was not possible for extra officers to be moved to areas where
there was
Many of the
additional police had received little or no
training.1092
1156.
In May 2007,
the Independent Commission on the Security Forces in Iraq
was
established
in the US. It was led by General James L. Jones, a retired US
Marine, who
had
previously served as the Supreme Allied Commander Europe and
subsequently
held the
post of US National Security Advisor from 2009 to 2010. Included in
the team
of 20
was ACC Duncan McCausland, a serving PSNI officer.1093
The
Commission was
tasked with
assessing the capability of the ISF; their ability to maintain
Iraq’s territorial
integrity,
deny international terrorists safe haven, reduce sectarianism and
bring greater
security in
the next 12 to 18 months.
1089
JIC
Assessment, 6 September 2007, ‘Baghdad Security Plan: Impact and
Prognosis’.
1090
Report to
Congress, 29 August 2006, Measuring
Stability and Security in Iraq.
1091
Report to
Congress, 30 November 2006, Measuring
Stability and Security in Iraq.
1092
Report to
Congress, 2 March 2007, Measuring
Stability and Security in Iraq.
1093
Report, 6
September 2007, ‘The Report of the Independent Commission on the
Security
Forces of Iraq’.
325