The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
88.
The meeting
of the National Security Council on 16 August decided that
the
US strategy
should be launched at the UN; but not what that strategy should
be.
89.
Dr Rice
wrote in her memoir that, in the National Security Council on 16
August,
“There was
unanimous agreement that our new strategy should be launched at
the
United
Nations, but we did not decide the question of what the President
would say.”34
90.
When
Mr Straw met Secretary Powell during an unpublicised visit to
the US
on 20
August, he was informed that Mr Blair’s Note to President Bush
of 28 July
had been
very timely; and that President Bush was keen to hear the outcome
of
their
talks.
91.
Mr Straw
informed Secretary Powell that:
•
Mr Blair
had been irritated to find himself in the position, where the US
and
UK had been
“outed” before they had been able to make the case with
the
public for
action against Iraq.
•
The UK’s
draft dossier on Iraq did not in his view lead
inexorably
to
the conclusion that military action was the only way to deal
with
Saddam Hussein.
•
A better
case for action could be made.
92.
Mr Straw
argued that the case for an international coalition was
overwhelming
and UN
“involvement” was essential. Military action would easier for the
UK if
there was a
UN resolution.
93.
Mr Blair
wanted a “hard‑edged ultimatum” issued by the UN with a clear
link
to military
action. He would stand by the US, but he was worried. The “UN was
the
way
through”; it was “an opportunity not an obstacle”.
94.
If Saddam
Hussein accepted inspectors on US and UK terms, the UK
view
was that
the case for military action would be ended “for the time
being”.
95.
Mr Straw
and Secretary Powell agreed that a key question was whether
they
could live
with a Saddam Hussein who had fulfilled the UN
mandate.
96.
Lord Williams
of Baglan, Special Adviser to Mr Straw from 2001 to 2005, told
the
Inquiry
that:
“As the
summer months approached I felt increasingly that the war was
becoming
unavoidable
and the Bush Administration had made up its mind on this
course
of action.
The only question remaining was whether the UK would join in
the
34
Rice
C. No Higher
Honour: A Memoir of My Years in Washington. Simon
& Schuster, 2011.
35
Statement,
9 January 2011, pages 6‑7.
110