The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
501.
The IPU
paper’s broad assumption in favour of administration of a small
sector
for a short
period was reflected in the guidance for UK officials attending the
US
inter‑agency
Rock Drill on post-conflict issues on 21 and 22
February.213
502.
The guidance,
agreed by Mr Ehrman and Lt Gen Pigott, was submitted to
Ministers
503.
In the
second half of February, Treasury officials expressed concern
about
the
resource implications of the UK taking on responsibility for a
geographical
sector of
Iraq.
504.
They
advised that the “emerging politics” of post-conflict Iraq
pointed
to a much
longer and larger commitment than initial MOD estimates
suggested.
505.
Papers by
No.10 and the Treasury on the financing of
post-conflict
reconstruction
also emphasised the risk of a significantly higher cost to the
UK
in the
absence of a UN mandate.
506.
On 19
February, Treasury officials updated Mr Brown on post-conflict
issues for
meetings
with Mr John Snow, the US Secretary of the Treasury, and other
G7 Finance
Ministers:
“Iraqi
reconstruction may come up at this meeting. Even if Mr Snow
does not raise it,
you may
wish to. Our sense is that momentum on the issue is developing very
fast,
and there
is a risk that the financing agenda could be set by policy
decisions taken
in Foreign
and Defence Ministries. Sharing ideas with Mr Snow may be a
useful way
to begin to
redress this balance. An additional approach would be to write
round
Whitehall
colleagues sharing your concerns (for instance, about the economic
and
financing
implications of foreign and defence policy
decisions).”215
507.
Officials
attached a paper identifying three “pitfalls” on the path to
achieving
Treasury
objectives in Iraq (establishing prosperity and stability while
sharing the
cost fairly):
•
UN cover.
Without this, the UK would have to contribute more to
the
reconstruction
effort, IFIs would find it hard to engage, and the
international
community
would be unable to resolve crucial financing issues such as
debt
rescheduling.
•
Being
realistic about the decisions a transitional Iraqi government could
take.
It could be
illegitimate and destabilising for the transitional government to
take
decisions
on Iraqi economic policy.
213
Minute
Chilcott to Private Secretary [FCO], 20 February 2003, ‘Iraq:
Day-After (Phase IV)’ attaching
Paper
[unattributed], ‘Iraq Day
After: Guidance for Officials at US ROCK Drill’.
214
Minute
Pollard to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 20 February 2003, ‘Iraq:
Day After’.
215
Minute
[Treasury junior official] to Chancellor, 19 February 2003, ‘Update
on Iraq’
attaching Paper
Country
Economics and Policy Team, 19 February 2003, ‘Iraqi reconstruction:
pitfalls and process’.
398