The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
708.
Mr Tinline
told the Inquiry:
“… once we
got to PIC and we could hand over control, at that point you could
sort
of take a
deep breath and say; then what? Until we had got to that point and
had got
out of the
city, I think we were very focused on: okay, how do we get to that
point?”332
709.
Resolution
1790 (2007) was adopted by the United Nations Security
Council
on
18 December 2007.333
It extended
arrangements for the presence of the MNF-I
in Iraq
until 31 December 2008. Thereafter, the Security Council took note
of the
objectives
stated in the Iraqi Government’s letter in relation to the
resolution, “including
the
statement that the Government of Iraq considers this to be its
final request to the
Security
Council for the extension of the mandate of the Multi-National
Force”.
710.
On 19
December, Mr Brown discussed Iraq briefly with President
Bush.334
Mr Brown
welcomed PIC in Basra and stressed the importance of full support
from
the
international community for provincial elections. Gen Petraeus was
reported to be
positive
about progress in the South and about US/UK
consultation.
711.
On 20
December, Mr Prentice sent an email to Mr Miliband’s
Private Secretary to
tell him
that JAM1’s release was planned for the following
evening.335
This
followed a
recommendation
by Maj Gen Binns which had been agreed by MNF(I). Prime
Minister
Maliki had
welcomed the proposal.
712.
On the same
day, Mr Miliband’s Private Secretary confirmed that he was
content
713.
Government
officials working closely with the military told JAM1 the news
that
evening and
they agreed he would leave detention late the following
evening.337
714.
On 20
December, the JIC circulated an Assessment of Iraqi security
strategy and
the
proficiency of Iraqi Security Forces.338
The JIC’s
detailed conclusions about the ISF
are
addressed in Section 12.1, but its Key Judgements
included:
“I. Greater
centralisation of Iraqi national security decision making has
resulted in
more
effective implementation. The Ministry of Defence is steadily
building capacity,
but is
unlikely to achieve complete self-reliance by the end of 2008. The
Ministry of
Interior is
still largely ineffective, with endemic sectarianism and
corruption.
“II. For
the foreseeable future the army will depend heavily on the
coalition for
air
support, logistics, heavy fire support and specialist enablers such
as real time
332
Private
hearing, 24 June 2010, page 17.
333
United
Nations Security Council resolution 1790 (2007).
334
Letter
Fletcher to Gould, 19 December 2007, ‘Prime Minister’s VTC with US
President, 19 December’.
335
Email
Prentice to Hickey, 20 December 2007, ‘Iraq: [NAME OF OPERATION]:
Imminent Release’.
336
Email
Hickey to Prentice, 20 December 2007, ‘Iraq: [NAME OF OPERATION]:
Imminent Release’.
337
Email
government official working closely with the military, 23 December
2007, ‘[NAME OF
OPERATION]:
End of Act 1, curtain up on Act 2’.
338
JIC
Assessment, 20 December 2007, ‘Iraqi Security Forces: Two Steps
Forward’.
312