The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
572.
In relation to
biological weapons:
•
UNSCOM had
been unable to verify the production and destruction
warheads
for the Al
Hussein missile. Iraq had declared that five warheads had
been
filled with
anthrax and 16 with botulinum toxin. A week after the July
meeting
of experts
in Baghdad, a senior Iraqi official had stated that there had
been
16 warheads
filled with anthrax and five filled with botulinum toxin. The
“new
explanation
contradicted all accounts of the unilateral destruction of
special
warheads”
provided over “the previous three years by Iraqi personnel
directly
involved in
warhead filling and destruction activities”.
•
No evidence
existed about the number of R-400 bombs filled with
biological
agent, and
Iraq had provided “no consistent explanation” for the allocation
of
biological
agents to weapons.
•
Iraq had
pursued the development of drop tanks for dissemination of
biological
agent “with
the utmost vigour”, but the team of international experts
had
assessed
that Iraq’s account of the project could not be
verified.
•
Iraq had
modified commercial chemical insecticide equipment to
develop
aerosol
generators to disseminate biological agents. A document submitted
by
Iraq
reported successful testing of such devices in August 1998. Iraq
had not
accounted
for the “final disposition” of the devices produced.
•
The level
of production of biological agents remained unverifiable, and it
was not
possible to
determine if agents had been dried to enhance storage
stability.
•
The
material balance of biological growth media acquired and consumed
was
“full of
uncertainties”.
573.
Mr Butler
stated that, after Lt Gen Kamil’s departure from Iraq, UNSCOM had
been
“confronted
with the fact that Iraq had successfully implemented concealment on
a large
scale”.
UNSCOM’s understanding of Iraq’s programmes had been achieved
“largely
through
forensic methods”. The verification of Iraq’s declarations had been
made “far
more
difficult than should have been the case” as a result of
Iraq’s:
•
“policy and
practice of concealment”;
•
“unilateral
destruction” of weapons and related materials; and
•
“repeated
denial of the existence of relevant documents on proscribed
activities,
with the
exception of those Iraq unilaterally chooses to
provide”.
574.
UNSCOM also
continued to find dual-use items and materials which should
have
been
declared by Iraq.
575.
The report
stated that Iraq had rejected a request for a Russian AN-30
aerial
surveillance
aircraft and its support unit to be based at the Rasheed airbase on
security
grounds.
The Commission had rejected an Iraqi suggestion that the aircraft
be based
at Habbaniyah,
120km from Baghdad.
130