4.1 |
Iraq WMD assessments, pre-July 2002
•
A statement
that extending short-range missile systems beyond 150km
and
retention
of Al Hussein missiles would be a breach of resolution
687.
•
The
addition, to the assessment that Iraq had a covert chemical and
biological
weapons
programme, of a statement that Iraq was in breach of resolution
687.
•
The
addition of a judgement that Iraq had the capability to produce
cyclosarin.
•
A box
setting out the effects of anthrax, botulinum toxin and
aflatoxin.
•
A statement
that: “Strategies to conceal and protect key parts of the
chemical
and
biological weapons programmes from a military attack or a UN
inspection
have been
developed.” These included “use of transportable laboratories; use
of
covert
facilities; dispersal of equipment when a threat is
perceived”.
•
A statement
that: “Some of these techniques [concealment and protection]
also
apply to
the nuclear and missile programmes. In particular we know that
the
Iraqi
leadership has recently ordered the dispersal of its most sensitive
WMD
equipment
and material.”
383.
Commenting on
the draft of what he described as the “WMD Proliferators’
Dossier”,
Mr Sebastian
Wood, Counsellor for External Affairs at the British Embassy
Washington,
suggested
there was a need to “try to present the paper in its wider context
alongside
other
evidence of our commitment to a wide range of
non/counter-proliferation tools”.168
384.
In response to
receiving a copy of the draft text on Iraq only, Mr Wood wrote
to
Mr Ricketts:
“Firstly,
if the primary aim of this exercise is to build public
understanding of and
support for
decisive action to prevent Saddam’s further acquisition of WMD,
we
think that
whatever is published should spotlight the nexus between State
sponsors
of
terrorism and WMD, and the associated risk that State-developed
WMD
technology
is made available to terrorists who would not hesitate to use it:
the [US]
Administration
have repeatedly stated that this is their number one concern,
and
focusing
the dossier on this risk would bring out more vividly the threat to
the UK.
Neither
does that at the moment.”169
385.
Mr Wood
questioned the urgency in producing the document and
recommended
that US
policy officials, including Dr Condoleezza Rice, President Bush’s
National
Security
Advisor, should be given a chance to comment on the tactics and
timing of
publication:
“We would not want them to think we are bouncing them on such a
politically
sensitive
issue.”
386.
Mr Straw
was advised on 22 March that the evidence would not
convince
public
opinion that there was an imminent threat from Iraq.
168
Fax Wood to
Miller, 20 March 2002, ‘WMD Proliferators’ Dossier’ attaching
Minute O’Neill to Wood,
20 March
2002, ‘WMD Proliferators’ Dossier’.
169
Fax Wood to
Miller, 20 March 2002, ‘WMD Proliferators’ Dossier’ attaching Email
Wood to Ricketts,
20 March
2002, ‘Re: US/UK: WMD paper’.
83