12.1  |  Security Sector Reform

As well as increasing the number of US and Iraqi troops in Baghdad, President Bush

announced a further focus on SSR:

“In keeping with the recommendations of the Iraq Study Group [described in

Section 9.5], we will increase the embedding of American Advisors in Iraqi Army

units, and partner a coalition brigade with every Iraqi Army division. We will help

the Iraqis build a larger and better‑equipped army, and we will accelerate the

training of Iraqi forces, which remains the essential US security mission in Iraq.”

1118.  On 17 January, the JIC produced an Assessment commissioned by the Iraq

Senior Officials Group.1054 It stated:

“The success of new US plans will depend in part on the willingness of the Iraqi

Government to take on sectarian and political militias. Maliki will not take action

which risks breaking the Shia United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) and bringing down his

government. Only a small proportion of the ISF are currently both willing and able

to take on the Shia militias. In Baghdad the ISF will need support from MNF combat

units beyond 2007. Similar support will be required in the Sunni Arab heartlands if

de facto control of large areas is not to pass to the insurgents.”

1119.  The US view of what was necessary to stabilise the situation in Iraq was reflected

in an assessment produced and published in January 2007 by the US National

Intelligence Council.1055 On the ISF it stated:

“Despite real improvements, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) – particularly the Iraqi

police – will be hard pressed in the next 12‑18 months to execute significantly

increased security responsibilities, and particularly to operate independently against

Shia militias with success. Sectarian divisions erode the dependability of many units,

many are hampered by personnel and equipment shortfalls, and a number of Iraqi

units have refused to serve outside of the areas where they were recruited.”

1120.  It also judged that if a rapid drawdown of coalition forces were to occur, the ISF

“would be unlikely to survive as a non‑sectarian national institution”.

1121.  Mr Blair met General David Petraeus, the new Commander MNF‑I on

6 February.1056 They discussed Iraq’s security institutions and agreed that there were

still problems with funding, equipment and key enablers such as intelligence. They also

discussed the loyalty of the ISF and agreed that it was vital that the Iraqi Government

was able to impose its authority. Gen Petraeus agreed to lobby the Government on

matters such as a replacement commander for 10th Division if a solution was not

forthcoming. Mr Blair said that the UK would stay in Basra Palace and do more training

and mentoring.

1054  JIC Assessment, 17 January 2007, ‘Iraqi Security Forces: Prospects in 2007’.

1055  [US] National Intelligence Estimate, [approved] 29 January 2007, Prospects for Iraq’s Stability:

a Challenging Road Ahead (Key judgments).

1056  Letter Banner to McNeil, 6 February 2007, ‘Prime Minister’s Meeting with David Petraeus’.

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