The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
We also
need to bear in mind that the aftermath could arise with little or
no prior
conflict,
in the event that the regime collapses under pressure. Although the
US
tend to
believe that the regime would indeed collapse very quickly, their
thinking
on the
aftermath is, paradoxically, focused almost entirely on managing a
post-
conflict
scenario.”
876.
Mr Watkins
added that the US recognised the importance of aftermath
planning,
but their
thinking remained:
“… somewhat
immature, fitting the problem to their pre-conceived solution.
In
particular
… they continue to have difficulty understanding why anybody might
think
that some
kind of UN umbrella will be important in the aftermath stage. We
need to
keep trying
to inject realism into their thinking.”
877.
Mr Watkins
reported that Mr Hoon believed the UK should:
“Continue
trying to influence US thinking on the aftermath, recognising that
this is
not
something which can be neatly separated from any conflict phase
(and indeed,
might arise
without conflict at all).”
878.
Sir David
Manning sent the letter to Mr Blair. He drew attention to separate
advice
on
sensitivities associated with the call-out of UK military
Reservists.424
879.
The MOD was
right to advise that a badly-handled aftermath would
make
intervention
in Iraq “a net failure” and to conclude that thinking on the
post-
conflict
phase should guide the UK’s approach to the conflict.
880.
The
evidence seen by the Inquiry indicates that the MOD did start to
consider
post-conflict
operations as an integral part of the overall military campaign,
but
against an
assumption that the UK should seek to minimise the size and
duration
of its
post-conflict deployment.
881.
Post-conflict
issues were raised by a small number of participants in
the
Parliamentary
debates on resolution 1441.
882.
The
concerns raised included:
•
the need to
start planning now;
•
the
importance of planning for the worst when preparing for
the
humanitarian
consequences of conflict; and
•
the need to
consider unfinished business elsewhere in the world.
424
Minute
Manning to Prime Minister, [undated and untitled], attaching Letter
Watkins to Manning,
19 November
2002, ‘Iraq: Military Planning after UNSCR 1441’.
260