4.3 |
Iraq WMD assessments, October 2002 to March 2003
•
Iraq
intended to declare a small part of its illegal programmes, and
overload
UNMOVIC
with large quantities of information on legitimate
activities.
•
WMD were
seen as vital to the regime’s survival, so a core WMD capability
and
infrastructure
must be retained.
•
Iraq was
concerned about the provisions for conducting interviews of
Iraqis
outside
Iraq, which could expose illicit procurement.
•
There was
concern about the potential destruction by the inspectors
of
dual‑use facilities.
72.
Mr Scarlett
commented that the concerns about exposing illicit procurement
might
be
referring to conventional weapons programmes and that the dual-use
facilities
supported
“the WMD programmes”.
73.
Mr Scarlett
wrote that the intelligence confirmed earlier JIC judgements,
including
the
identification of “overload” as a potential strategy. There was no
intelligence on which
illegal
programmes might be declared.
74.
Mr Scarlett
also drew attention to preparations to intimidate potential
Iraqi
interviewees.
75.
Mr Scarlett’s
other comments included the observations that there seemed to
be:
“… an
inconsistency in Iraq’s policy towards inspectors. The
[intelligence] indicates
the regime
plans to let the inspectors into any site. But it also indicates
that the
regime must
rethink a core WMD capability.”
76.
Mr Scarlett
concluded that it was “possible” that Iraq was “so confident of
its
concealment
strategy that it believes inspectors will not discover prohibited
activity.
Nonetheless,
this [intelligence] is important in that it further confirms that
ultimately the
Iraqi
regime does not envisage having to accept genuine and complete
disarmament,
and is
confident in its ability to mislead inspectors.”
77.
The
intelligence described by Mr Scarlett was based on reported
comments,
including
from someone with access to senior members of the Iraqi regime; but
it was
not quoting
Saddam Hussein’s views.
78.
Mr Alastair
Campbell, Mr Blair’s Director of Communications and Strategy,
wrote in
his
diaries:
“There was
some interesting stuff around on deception programmes, for
example
[Iraqi]
officials being forced to put papers and materials in their homes
with the
warning
that they and their families would be harmed if they were
lost.”24
24
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power:
Countdown
to Iraq.
Hutchinson,
2012.
305