The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“The way to
present the case is to focus on the practical advantages of
involving the
UN. But
there is also the question of international legitimacy. We shall
need UNSC
authorisation
for practical purposes eg any change to the sanctions regime and
to
the
Oil-for-Food arrangements, as well as for the far-reaching reforms
we plan to
introduce
to Iraq. The lawfulness of an occupation, post-conflict, will also
be related
to the
lawfulness of the military action itself.”
142.
The note
stated that the US was “putting a huge effort into humanitarian
relief
and
immediate post-conflict reconstruction, which the military expect
to control”, but US
thinking on
the transition between Coalition military administration and the
transfer of
power to a
new Iraqi government was “bogged down in inter-agency
disputes”.
143.
On Iraqi
exiles, the background note stated that they “can join the debate
on Iraq’s
future but
will have to test their credibility with the Iraqi people, not be
parachuted in by
the
US/UK”.
144.
The background
note concluded that Mr Blair’s visit was well timed to
influence
US planning:
“Without
agreement, which can only come from President Bush and the
Prime
Minister,
on the overall framework for day-after, operational planning will
continue
to be
handicapped.”
145.
The briefing
provided by the MOD included a section on
“aftermath”.75
Suggested
lines for
Mr Blair to use with President Bush included:
•
There was
no doubt the Coalition could win the war, but it was “equally
certain
that we
face a risk of ‘losing the peace’”.
•
Any
post-conflict honeymoon would be brief, if it occurred at
all.
•
Strategic
questions about future governance were not academic and
needed
answering
quickly.
•
Choices
made early in the campaign “can shape – often irrevocably –
our
options
months, even years later”.
146.
The short
Cabinet Office paper from Mr Drummond offered a “few OD Sec
points,
just in
case they slip through the briefing”.76
Those
included:
•
the
importance of offering a clear public vision for the future of
Iraq;
•
the need to
press for agreement on the post-conflict role of the
UN;
•
the
importance of integrated Coalition planning on post-conflict
issues;
•
the need
for “top political impetus” on post-conflict issues;
75
Letter
Williams to Rycroft, 29 January 2003, ‘Prime Minister’s briefing –
Iraq’
attaching
Paper [unattributed
and undated], ‘Iraq – Aftermath’.
76
Minute
Drummond to Rycroft, 28 January 2003, ‘Iraq: US
Visit’.
336