The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
to think
that Iraq was concealing some WMD, he needed evidence to put to the
Security
Council. He
was receiving “a flow of half promises” on Iraqi co-operation and
needed
more
time.
337.
Dr Blix also
commented that “perhaps there was not much WMD in Iraq after
all”;
and that
the French and Germans were “unsure” about mobile BW production
facilities:
“It would
be paradoxical and absurd if 250,000 men were to invade Iraq and
find
very little.”
338.
Mr Blair
responded that “our intelligence was clear that Saddam had
reconstituted
his WMD
programme”.
339.
The record
stated that Dr Blix had “concluded that he accepted the need
for
time‑lines
and bench-marks”.
340.
In his account
of the conversation, Dr Blix wrote that he had said:
“Only at
three sites to which we had gone on the basis of intelligence had
there been
any result
at all.
“Personally,
I tended to think that Iraq still concealed weapons of mass
destruction,
but I
needed evidence. Perhaps there were not many such weapons in
Iraq
341.
Sir Richard
Dearlove counselled on 17 February that there was no
guarantee
that
inspections would produce conclusive physical evidence of
WMD.
342.
In a minute to
Sir David Manning on 17 February, responding to a request
for
views on
way ahead on Iraq (see Section 3.7), Sir Richard Dearlove stated
that there
was ample
evidence, including from Dr Blix, that Iraq was not, and had no
intention
of,
complying with its obligations.128
Given the
resources Saddam Hussein had
available
to thwart inspections, and the scale of the task of uncovering
something
“truly
damning”, there was no guarantee that the inspections would produce
conclusive
physical evidence.
343.
Sir Richard
Dearlove’s Private Secretary advised Sir David Manning
on
20 February
that the “chances of a successful inspection are
slim”.129
SIS had
sent
messages to
its best placed sources “emphasising the utmost importance of a
major
find in the
next two weeks, and asking them to do everything possible to try
and identify
where
materials or papers are being hidden”. The chances of a potential
defector were
“not encouraging”.
127
Blix
H. The Search
for Weapons of Mass Destruction: Disarming Iraq. Bloomsbury
Publishing Plc, 2005.
128
Letter
Dearlove to Manning, 17 February 2003, ‘Iraq: The Way
Forward’.
129
Letter PS/C
to Manning, 20 February 2003, ‘Iraq: UNMOVIC Inspection and
Defectors’.
354