The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
turn round
the arguments.” Mr Straw was to go to New York “with the
message from TB
that we
needed to turn the clusters document to our
advantage”.323
1030.
Mr Blair
told Cabinet that the argument boiled down to the
question
of whether
Saddam Hussein would ever voluntarily co-operate with the
UN
to disarm
Iraq.
1031.
Mr Blair
concluded that it was for the Security Council to determine
whether
Iraq was
co-operating fully.
1032.
Mr Blair
explained to Cabinet on 6 March that Dr Blix and
Dr ElBaradei would
be reporting
to the Security Council the following day.324
1033.
Dr Blix
was proposing to put forward a document which analysed the
outstanding
disarmament
issues. It was important that the facts should be made
public.
1034.
The UK was
discussing an amendment to the draft resolution – “to
encourage
support
from those members who remained undecided” – with some Security
Council
members.
The support of Mexico and Chile “could be critical to the vote”. It
was not clear
what Russia
and France would do. The “argument boiled down to whether”
Saddam
Hussein
“would ever voluntarily co-operate with the United Nations to
disarm Iraq.
Members of
the Security Council needed to be persuaded on this
point.”
1035.
Mr Blair
also said that he had agreed with President Bush on the need for
the UN
to be
“heavily involved” in “the post-conflict situation, in the event
that military action was
necessary”.
They had also discussed the importance of moving the Middle East
Peace
Process
forward on the basis of a “Road Map”.
1036.
The points
made in discussion included:
•
the
amendment of the draft Security Council resolution should
incorporate
a deadline
“since the public attached importance to the inspection
work”;
•
the
“integrity and dignity” of the UN process was being “diminished” by
the
“political
arm-twisting” by some members;
•
reconstruction
of Iraq would require a UN mandate, not just their
involvement;
otherwise
the right of Coalition forces to engage in reconstruction work
would
be limited
by their status as an occupation force;
•
the focus
on Iraq’s WMD should be maintained, not “diverted to
discovery
and destruction
of ballistic missiles, albeit the latter could deliver toxic
material
in their
warheads”; and
323
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power:
Countdown
to
Iraq. Hutchinson,
2012.
324
Cabinet
Conclusions, 6 March 2003.
364