13.1 |
Resources
208.
Ms Short
said that work on post‑conflict issues needed to be taken
forward
urgently
and emphasised the need for extra resources, the potential effect
of chemical
and
biological weapons on civilians and the importance of involving the
UN.
209.
Summarising
the discussion, Mr Blair said that the “priorities for the
immediate
future”
included preparatory work on planning the aftermath of any military
action.
210.
On 21 January,
at Ms Short’s request, Mr Fernie provided advice on “how
to
maximise
the chances of securing additional funding from the Treasury to
cover the
costs of
[a] DFID humanitarian response”.136
211.
Mr Fernie
recommended that Ms Short should speak, rather than write,
to
Mr Brown.
A letter would invite a formal response, and Treasury officials
were likely
to caution
Mr Brown against providing any broad assurance on funding and
might
recommend
that DFID “unpick” its 2003/04 spending plan, to be agreed shortly,
in
order to
provide more funding for Iraq.
212.
Mr Fernie
continued:
“Mr [Mark]
Lowcock’s [DFID Director Finance and Corporate Performance]
advice
is that the
best time to extract maximum funds from the central Reserve is
when
the
political pressure is at its height. We might guess that such a
time will come in
a month or
so – by which time budgets for our existing programmes would be
more
secure,
with our 2003/04 framework finalised and on its way to
publication.”
213.
Ms Short
commented: No – I don’t want to ring Ch X [the Chancellor of
the
Exchequer]
… I wanted to put humanitarian considerations into Gov[ernment]
mind not
just to
squeeze some money.”137
Rather than
write or speak to Mr Brown, she would
write to
Mr Blair. That letter was sent on 5 February.
214.
Ms Short
described DFID’s preparations to respond to a humanitarian crisis
in Iraq
in the
House of Commons on 30 January.
215.
Ms Short’s
briefing for the debate included, at her request, a figure for
the
UK’s
“responsibility within the international system” for contributing
to humanitarian
relief
efforts.138
The
briefing stated that the UK’s Gross National Income (GNI)
was
5.5 percent
of the total GNI of members of the Organisation for Economic
Co‑operation
and
Development (OECD) in 2000. The UK would not expect to contribute
much more
than that
percentage to any international humanitarian relief
effort.
136
Minute
Fernie to PS/Secretary of State [DFID], 21 January 2003, ‘Iraq
Contingency Planning:
Financial Provision’.
137
Manuscript
comment Short, 22 January 2003, on Minute Fernie to PS/Secretary of
State [DFID],
21 January
2003, ‘Iraq Contingency Planning: Financial
Provision’.
138
Minute
Fernie to PS/Secretary of State [DFID], 28 January 2003, ‘Iraq:
Contingency Planning –
Commons
Debate on Thursday’ attaching Briefing, [undated], ‘House of
Commons Opposition Debate,
Thursday 30
January 2003: Humanitarian Contingency Planning in
Iraq’.
477