The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
207.
The MOD
official explained that:
“The
current plan envisaged our withdrawal from the PJCC four days
before the
handover of
the Palace site; but we would leave the PJCC by 31 August
whatever
the state
of play over the Palace.”
208.
On 19 August
Maj Gen Binns would give his assessment of readiness
to
Gen Petraeus,
who “continued to take a rational approach” to the UK
plans.
Mr Asquith’s farewell
calls in Baghdad also suggested Iraqi Government support
for
the handover.
209.
The MOD
official wrote that the leadership summit had not yet taken
place,
although
“all the main players were in town and engaging in bilateral
discussions”.
210.
Lt Gen Rollo
hoped that it would convene that week.95
He also
reported that
there were
well-developed plans for Baghdad to take further offensive action
against
insurgents
in the run-up to the autumn: “Provided the politics can come right,
or even not
go badly
wrong, there is a clear way ahead.”
211.
On 16 August,
Mr Asquith wrote a valedictory letter to Mr Miliband
which
characterised
Iraq as “still wracked by the culture of fear, distrust and
prejudice,
obstructing
political compromise”.96
212.
Mr Asquith
considered that:
“The surge
has failed to create the space for politics to work because the
military
(tactical)
successes (local sectarian security structures loyal to the MNF)
conflict
directly
with the political objective (inclusive and integrated national
Iraqi authority).”
213.
The letter
gave two reasons why each success was accompanied by
“further
complications”.
First, “knowledge
of what is happening on the ground is shockingly thin,
particularly
in Baghdad where the theatre policy is decided” which made
analysing the
significance
of what was known “fragile”. Mr Asquith revealed that: “The
[Multi-National]
Force’s
statistics on security – or even basic services – differ wildly
from what our LE
[locally
engaged] staff (and the Iraqi media) report.”
214.
Secondly,
Mr Asquith wrote: “Domestic politics (and media coverage)
have
coloured
the approach of the whole coalition, producing an ambivalence that
has been
corrosive.”
215.
Mr Asquith
considered that the benchmarks set by Congress were unlikely
to
reveal
anything significant about Iraq because: “The timeframe … has
placed impossible
demands on
the Iraqi Government and coalition … The lessons of the
Constitution have
been
forgotten.”
95
Minute
Rollo to CDS, 13 August 2007, ‘SBMR-I’s Weekly Report (265) 13 Aug
07’.
96
Letter
Asquith to Miliband, 16 August 2007, ‘Iraq:
Valedictory’.
222