The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
563.
On the same
day, Maj Gen Fry provided advice for the Chiefs of Staff,
reviewing
planning
for operations in Iraq as requested by Lt Gen Pigott on 8
August.230
564.
Maj Gen Fry
reported that the US was now working on a “hybrid option”,
which
contained
elements of both the running and generated start. The “importance
of the
development
of an axis in the North is now fully recognised”, and a contingency
plan
was being
developed to commit significant US forces, possibly in addition to
any
coalition
contributions.
565.
The most
significant development was that Land Command now believed it
could
deploy HQ
ARRC, HQ 1st (UK) Armoured Division, one triangular brigade, 16 Air
Assault
Brigade and
a logistic brigade some 124 days after a political decision to
allow overt
preparations
for deployment. There would be some risk to the UK’s ability to
deploy
forces in
2004:
“… the
overall penalties … would be severe, some roulement tour lengths
would be
extended to
12 months and the generation of armoured and mechanised HR
[High
Readiness]
forces in [20]04 would be put at risk.”
566.
Maj Gen Fry
advised that:
•
“The
northern approach offers the opportunity for greatest effect but
probably
carries the
highest risk.”
•
If a
northern option for a land package was not viable, a western
approach
through
Jordan could offer “very similar effects at less
risk”.
•
“A timely
effect in the South could probably only be achieved by the
ARG
[Amphibious
Ready Group] in support of the US MEF [Marine
Expeditionary
Force].”
567.
The risks of
the northern approach were listed in an Annex as:
•
The need to
be deployed in time to secure parts of the oilfields around
Kirkuk
from Iraqi
destruction.
•
The weather
from January to March could severely restrict air
operations.
•
The
distance to be travelled overland would be more than
1,000km.
•
The terrain
would constrain manoeuvre and considerable US engineer
support
would be
needed to cross the river Tigris.
•
Long lines
of communication and challenges to sustainability.
568.
The paper
invited the Chiefs of Staff to agree that potential UK force
contributions
could be
exposed to US planners to inform the CENTCOM planning
conference
scheduled
for 23 September; and that, if the UK was “to retain a claim to
leadership
230
Minute Fry
to DCDS(C), 30 August 2002, ‘PJHQ Update on Planning for Operations
Against Iraq’.
260